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Collective Rights Adjudication in U.S. Courts: 
Enforcing Human Rights at the Corporate Level 
Kathryn L. Boyd 
INTRODUCTION 
A wave of suits by victims of human rights abuses abroad 
suing large corporations in U.S. federal courts is affecting the 
normative and procedural development of domestic and inter-
national law. Corporations have become the defendants of 
choice for classes of foreign plaintiffs suing in U.S. courts for 
international law violations.1 Large entities, including Unocal, 
Texaco, Degussa, Ford, Daimler-Chrysler, Volkswagen, and 
Swiss, German, French, and Austrian banks have all been tar-
geted in international human rights suits in federal court by 
classes of plaintiffs alleging that their rights have been violated 
under customary international law (“CIL”) and demanding 
large-scale monetary and injunctive relief.2 The alleged of-
 
 1. Many of the corporate entities are large transnational corporations. The defi-
nition of transnational corporations (TNCs) (also referred to as “multinational corpora-
tions” (MNCs) or “multinational enterprises” (MNEs)) according to the U.N. Draft Code 
of Conduct on TNCs, is an enterprise 
comprising entities in two or more countries, regardless of the legal form and fields 
of activity of these entities, which operate under a system of decision-making, 
permitting coherent policies and a common strategy through one or more deci-
sion-making centres, in which the entities are so linked, by ownership or other-
wise, that one or more of them may be able to exercise a significant influence over 
the activities of others and, in particular, to share knowledge, resources and re-
sponsibilities with the others. 
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. ESCOR, Organizational Sess. for 
1988, Provisional Agenda Item 2, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/1988/39/Add. 1 (1988); see also 
PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 12-15 (1995) (defining 
“multinational enterprise” as an enterprise that engages in direct investment outside 
their home countries and including corporate groups based on parent-subsidiary rela-
tions alone). 
 2. See, e.g., Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98-CV-959, 1999 WL 719888  
(D.N.J. Sept. 14, 1999); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 
1997); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 
850 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), vacated sub nom., Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 
(2d Cir. 1998); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (mem.).; Class 
Action Complaint, Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, No. 98-3598, 1999 WL 717260 
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fenses take place in faraway places and often in faraway times. 
Moreover, the plaintiffs allege violations of international, not 
U.S., law. For example, families of Holocaust victims have filed 
class actions for abuses that occurred over fifty years ago in 
Europe when Swiss banks and other corporate entities cooper-
ated with the Nazi government.3 Convergence of the uniquely 
American class action procedure and the substantive interna-
tional law of human rights not only affects the development of 
international human rights norms but may finally achieve the 
elusive goal of compliance with international norms.4 
This new trend of “mass tort” transnational litigation is an 
 
(D.N.J. Sept. 13, 1999); Complaint, Pollack v. Seimens AG, No. 98-CV-5499 (E.D.N.Y. 
filed Aug. 30, 1999); Complaint, Polgar v. Daimler Chrysler, No. 99-CV-02527 
(E.D.N.Y. filed May 4, 1999); Complaint, Duveen v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 99-CV-
0388 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 19, 1999); Complaint, Hirsch v. Fried. Krupp AG, No. 98-CV-
4280 (D.N.J. filed Sept. 11, 1998); Complaint, Gross v. Volkswagen, No. 98-CV-4104 
(D.N.J. filed Aug. 31, 1998); Complaint, Watman v. Deutsche Bank, No. 98-CV-3938 
(S.D.N.Y. filed June 3, 1998); Amended Complaint, Bodner v. Banque Paribas, No. 97 
Civ. 7433 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 20, 1998); Complaint, Kor v. Bayer, 99-CV-0036 (S.D. 
Ind. filed Feb. 17, 1998) (claims by Holocaust survivors for injuries suffered from death 
camp experiments). 
 3. Several class action suits were brought (and settled) against Swiss banks 
(Union Bank of Switzerland, Credit Suisse, and Swiss Bank Corporation as joint de-
fendants) by Holocaust survivors and the relatives of Holocaust victims in an effort to 
recover money deposited in Swiss bank accounts prior to and during World War II. 
Joined were Holocaust survivors who were forced by Nazis to engage in slave labor and 
Holocaust survivors and heirs of Holocaust victims who had property looted by Nazis. 
The “Holocaust Plaintiffs” claimed that Swiss banks actively financed and knowingly 
accepted profits derived from slave labor as well as looted assets. See Amended Com-
plaint, World Council of Orthodox Jewish Communities, Inc. v. Union Bank of Switz., 
No. 97-CV-0461 (E.D.N.Y. filed July 1997); Amended Complaint, Friedman v. Union 
Bank of Switz., No. 96-CV-5161 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 21, 1996); Amended Complaint, 
Weisshaus v. Union Bank of Switz., No. 96-CV-4849 (E.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 3, 1996), con-
solidated as Telling-Grotch v. Union Bank of Switz., No. 96-5161 (E.D.N.Y. filed 1996). 
 4. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Internationalization of Domestic Law, in THE 
ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY 3-5 (Ralph G. Steinhardt & An-
thony D’Amato eds., 1999) (describing the contemporary accounts of the law of nations 
stress the convergence of international and domestic law, or “intermestic” law, whereby 
domestic law has been internationalized and international law has been domesticated). 
Compliance with international law, and in particular human rights law, has been the 
subject, even obsession, of modern international lawyers and scholars. See, e.g., ABRAM 
CHAYES ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS (1968); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995); HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (4th ed. 1994). Enforcement measures such as use of 
international fact-finding, surveillance, and peacekeeping forces for aid in enforcement, 
collective nonrecognition of unlawful acts, and diplomatic pressures will not be dis-
cussed in this article. However, most governments are ambivalent about the enforce-
ment of international law when it would disadvantage them. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 245 (1991). 
BOYD-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:18 AM 
1139] COLLECTIVE RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 1141 
inevitable development both in human rights litigation in the 
U.S. and in the realm of international human rights law in 
general. While federal courts have long been the forum for liti-
gation of private rights and economic disputes involving corpo-
rations, this “new wave” of class litigation involves public in-
ternational norms in a new context.5 
Private civil tort remedies have been available in the U.S. 
for almost twenty years since the Second Circuit ruled that the 
dormant Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) could be the basis of 
federal court subject matter jurisdiction over an action brought 
by an alien against a foreign government official for violations 
of CIL, or “violations of the law of nations.”6 However, only 
 
 5. Professors Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes describe the environment 
and human rights as part of “the ‘third wave’ issues that do not yield . . . readily to the 
calculus of power and interest, in contrast to the first and second wave preoccupation 
with physical and economic security, which have increasingly shouldered their way 
onto the international agenda.” ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE 
NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 123 
(1995); see generally, GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED 
STATES COURTS 17-18 (1996) (describing the distinction between “public” and “private” 
international law); Gordon A. Christenson, Customary International Human Rights 
Law in Domestic Court Decisions, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 225, 236-37 (1995/1996) 
(comparing private international law and enforcement of economic rights by U.S. 
courts in order to protect capital markets and voluntary market exchange). “The fact 
that economic activity throughout the world has become so complex and interrelated 
has meant both more assertions of jurisdictional authority and more resistance to such 
assertions.” SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 252. Controversies in the U.S. in the past 
have been with: 
1)  The application of United States law to prohibit foreign companies abroad that 
are substantially owned or controlled by United States nationals from doing busi-
ness with persons in countries deemed “enemies” of the United States (such as, at 
one time, China, Cuba, Iran and USSR). . . .  
2)  The application of United States antitrust laws to conduct outside the United 
States by non-nationals of the United States . . .  when such conduct has a sub-
stantial and foreseeable effect on United States commerce [(the “effects doctrine”)]. 
. . .  
3)  Orders by United States judicial or administrative authorities addressed to for-
eign firms or individuals for disclosure of documents located in another State for 
use in judicial or administrative proceedings in the United States without the 
permission of the State in which the persons or documents are located. 
4)  Withholding payments due to a foreign company or individual located abroad 
for the purpose of enforcing United States tax laws or restricting transfer of funds 
held in foreign branches of United States banks to persons subject to investigation 
or prosecution in the United States.  
Id. 
 6. The Alien Tort Claims Act provides: “The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction over any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994); see Filàr-
tiga  v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding ATCA provides federal court 
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since the case brought against Radovan Karadzic in 1996 have 
nongovernmental defendants been held liable under ATCA’s 
jurisdiction, paving the way for class action suits against cor-
porations whose international activity causes mass harm.7 
With the globalization of the economy, corporations con-
tinue to move into expanding markets in Asia, Eastern Europe, 
and Latin America.8 Ironically, corporations, as powerful inter-
national actors, play a dual role of enhancing basic human 
rights by eliminating poverty and misery in under-developed 
countries, while simultaneously pursuing profit at the expense 
of the weakest individuals.9 Corporate activity, particularly in 
the form of investment, generates economic development, a 
necessary condition for achieving human rights.10 Conversely, 
 
jurisdiction for alien to sue for violations of customary international law). 
 7. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e hold that sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction exists, that Karadzic may be found liable for genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity in his private capacity and for other violations in 
his capacity as a state actor, and that he is not immune from service of process.”). 
 8. Transnational corporations differ from multi-location domestic enterprises in 
a number of ways, including their capacity to locate productive facilities across na-
tional borders, to exploit local factor inputs thereby, to trade across frontiers in factor 
inputs between affiliates, to exploit their know-how in foreign markets without losing 
control over it, and to organize their managerial structure globally according to the 
most suitable mix of divisional lines of authorities. These factors permit multinationals 
to affect the international allocation of productive resources. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 1 
at 15; see also THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY (1982). The usual 
indicators of development are mainly industrialization, the growth of capital, and the 
application of technology and increase in GNP, which the entrance of multinationals to 
a country usually brings. In the 1950s and 1960s, a considerable shift in “development 
ideology” occurred. SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 350.  Resolutions of the U.N. recog-
nized that economic growth alone was not enough, but that human welfare should be 
the focus. In the 1980s, a new “development ideology moved to the forefront,” focusing 
on “reliance on the market, and skepticism about the ability of governments to achieve 
development.” Id. at 350. The U.N. has recently proclaimed a “’human right to devel-
opment’ which many construe as imposing an obligation on the part of developed coun-
tries to assist the needy countries.”  Id. at 355. 
 9. There is a distinction between abusive economic corporate activity and activ-
ity which rises to the level of a violation of fundamental human rights or criminal ac-
tivity; however, where that line is drawn is not always clear given the amorphous hu-
man rights standards. See infra Part II.B and accompanying notes; see also Jack 
Donnelly, Human Rights and Development: Complementary or Competing Concerns?, 
in 36 WORLD POLITICS 255 (1984); C.H. Schreuer, The Impact of International Institu-
tions on the Protection of Human Rights in Domestic Courts, 4 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 60 
(1974). 
 10. See David Kinley, The Legal Dimension of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN AUSTRALIAN LAW 6 (David Kinley ed., 1998) (noting the concern in developing na-
tions that economic development is ahead of guaranteeing human rights); see also Dec-
laration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 41st 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (1987) (proclaiming the right to development to be a 
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such development often results in conditions that are inimical 
to human rights. Moreover, governments curtail human rights 
for the sake of economic development.11 
Increasingly, the public has pressured U.S. companies to 
avoid marketing products produced by forced labor. Moreover, 
the companies have decided to restrict investments in countries 
known for human rights abuses (such as Burma and China).12 
These decisions reflect an increasing sensitivity toward corpo-
rate involvement in international law violations. Those victim-
ized by corporate activity now seek private redress for alleged 
violations of public law norms, further evidencing a commit-
ment to the idea that both the authority of State and the role of 
market, in principle, are limited by legal commitments to hu-
man rights.13 Disagreement and debate about the role and sig-
 
universal and inalienable right, nonetheless stressing the fact that it is also integral 
part of fundamental human rights which are interrelated and interdependent (arts. 
1(2) and 6(2)); JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
163-202 (1989) (asserting that development strategies should seek to minimize the 
shortfalls of three common trade-offs: needs, equality, and liberty). 
 11. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (alleging that 
the government authorized and participated in forcing natives to relocate, subjected 
them to forced labor, death, or torture, and committed other human rights violations); 
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527, 1994 WL 142006, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 
1994) (alleging that Ecuador harmed the indigenous people who were living in the rain-
forest); see also Martin A. Geer, Foreigners in Their Own Land: Cultural Land and 
Transnational Corporations–Emergent International Rights and Wrongs, 38 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 331, 353-54 (1998) (discussing multinationals link to environmental damage in 
sharp contrast to Transnational Corporations Code of Conduct). 
 12. See Barbara A. Frey, The Legal and Ethical Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations in the Protection of International Human Rights, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL 
TRADE 153, 157-58; see also, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a) (1994) (prohibiting grant of most 
favored nations status to countries with non-market economies that deny their citizens 
the rights or opportunity to emigrate); 22 U.S.C. § 2151(n) (1990) (Prohibition Against 
Foreign Assistance to Gross Violators of Human Rights, prohibiting economic aid to 
countries engaged in a “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights”); Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Decla-
ration, Annex I, at 5-8, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.177/20 (1995);. 
 13. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 434, 509 
(1990) (defining “international responsibility” which relates both to breaches of treaty 
and other breaches of legal duty); cf. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 
791-95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (recognizing the growing pressure to extend liabil-
ity to private actors but refusing to do so on the facts of the case); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 
963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D.Cal 1997); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. 
Cal. 1987). In the absence of compulsory dispute resolution mechanisms, such disputes 
are often resolved through diplomatic exchange and negotiated settlement. See id.; see 
also Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under International Law: Do Tort Reme-
dies Fit the Crime? 60 ALB. L. REV. 579, 588-89 (1997); see generally, STEPHEN R. 
RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY (1997) (pointing out the erro-
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nificance of companies in this geo-political realm is the back-
drop of the new wave of class litigation.14 
U.S. law has ample substantive theories and procedural 
mechanisms that permit the joinder of nongovernmental de-
fendants who cooperate with and support governmental human 
rights abuses.15 Unlike government officials, corporations with 
ties to the U.S., are more easily found for jurisdictional pur-
poses.16 Human rights plaintiffs’ attorneys need not worry 
 
neous assumption that international law never applies to non-state actors). 
 14. See International Rys. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1967); 
DONALDSON, supra note 8, at 11-12; see generally RICHARD J. BARNET & RONALD E. 
MÜLLER, GLOBAL REACH: THE POWER OF THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1974) 
(describing the global influence of multinational corporations); LOUIS TURNER, 
MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND THE THIRD WORLD (1973) (describing the economic, 
social, and political influence of multinational corporations on Third World countries).  
 15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19, 20. As in the earlier human rights cases, plaintiffs al-
lege that the corporate defendant joined in committing a “tort . . . in violation of the law 
of nations” in order for the ATCA to provide jurisdiction. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. at 
890. For example, in the case against Unocal, the district court used theories of joint 
liability to find that Unocal acted under color of law with the military government, the 
SLORC, that was widely condemned for its 1988 crackdown and campaign of repres-
sion against the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar. See id. at 892. Unocal and its 
executives who violated international law were subject to suit under the ATCA. 
Although there is no allegation that SLORC is physically selling Burmese citizens 
to the private defendants, plaintiffs allege that, despite their knowledge of 
SLORC’s practice of forced labor, both in general and with respect to the pipeline 
project, the private defendants have paid and continue to pay SLORC to provide 
labor and security for the pipeline, essentially treating SLORC as an overseer, ac-
cepting the benefit of and approving the use of forced labor. 
Id. 
Unocal vigorously den[ied] these allegations . . . and point[ed] to the company’s 
humanitarian projects in Myanmar, such as the construction of schools, ani-
mal-breeding farms, and hospitals. In a press conference . . . Assistant Secretary of 
State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor John Shattuck stated that “I do 
not, I want to make very clear, have any information to suggest that Unocal itself 
uses forced labor. . . . I’m persuaded that [Unocal is] very much trying to avoid un-
der any circumstances the use of forced labor.” 
Gregory J. Wallance, Linked to Slavery Doe v. Unocal Asks Whether American Compa-
nies Should Be Held Responsible for the Human Rights Abuses of the Foreign Govern-
ments That Are Their Business Partners, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, CORPORATE 
LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI Order No. B0-001E (June-July 
1998). 
 16.  
Jurisdiction to adjudicate has been generally based on territoriality or nationality . 
. . . Thus, the defendant’s presence, or his conduct or ownership of property . . .  
within the territory have been considered sufficient for a court to adjudicate the 
case. . . . A defendant, whose conduct outside the State had a substantial and fore-
seeable effect within the State . . .  has also been considered subject to judicial ju-
risdiction. . . .  States may also adjudicate cases involving domestic law based on 
protective, universal or passive jurisdiction . . . provided the defendant is present 
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about governmental immunities.17 Furthermore, plaintiffs can 
readily enforce their judgments because they can easily access 
the assets of transnational enterprises. 
Not only are domestic theories of joint liability expanding 
concepts of private liability for international law violations in 
the new class suits, but the application of Rule 23 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure itself may also affect the devel-
opment of the substantive human rights being asserted. 
Classes of human rights victims are asserting jurisdiction in 
federal court on the basis that their rights were violated as col-
lective entities. Moreover, federal courts are being asked to find 
and interpret customary international norms, such as cultural 
and economic rights for groups, that earlier cases against gov-
ernments and officials did not address. In this procedural pos-
ture, the adjudication of collective rights has pushed the mar-
gins of what has been considered “fundamental” or “universal” 
in human rights law. 
In both international and domestic contexts, the procedural 
joinder mechanism is Rule 23. The application of Rule 23 to en-
force collective claims expands and solidifies notions of amor-
phous substantive international human rights law. The result 
is a dynamic symbiosis of international and domestic law, 
whereby United States federal court procedure and substantive 
international law merge into domestic federal common law, 
which in turn establishes precedent for international tribunals 
and institutions.18 
This article focuses on the procedural mechanism of the 
class action under Rule 23 and its substantive effect in trans-
national human rights litigation. In a general critique of the 
class litigation against former president of the Philippines Fer-
dinand Marcos, Professor Steinhardt summarily dismissed the 
class action device for mass human rights cases as compromis-
ing the autonomy of the human rights victims.19 However, 
 
in the State.”  
 SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 255-56. 
 17. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 885-88 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (refusing 
to dismiss for act of state or Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). 
 18. This is a clear example of the transnational public law litigation, described by 
Professor Koh, in which the transnational nature of the party and claim structure is as 
focused on obtaining judicial declaration of transnational norms as upon resolving past 
disputes. See Harold H. Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 
2371 (1991).  
 19. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filàrtiga: Litigating Hu-
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there has been no in-depth analysis of the effects of class struc-
ture on the development or objectives of substantive or proce-
dural international human rights law. More particularly, there 
has been no analysis of whether the gains to collective justice 
justify the sacrifice of autonomy in the class suit. This article 
attempts to establish the beginnings of an analytical frame-
work, setting forth the practical and theoretical effects of class 
joinder on the enforcement of the substantive law of human 
rights. 
 Moreover, commentators have long questioned the proper 
function of U.S. courts in the international legal order.20 Draw-
ing from their history of class litigation, the federal courts’ 
process of interpreting international norms is unique in the 
arena of international institutions.21 This article explores the 
federal courts’ role as standard-maker for international class 
suits within the transnational dialogue between international 
institutions and federal courts.22 
 
man Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 65, 93 
(1995). Professor Steinhardt pointed out difficulties, such as confusion of causation is-
sues and impairment of jury function, impairment of client-counsel relationship, and 
overreaching by judges during the pretrial and settlement phases. These are common 
criticisms by opponents of class actions in general. See, e.g., STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, 
FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987); Robert G. 
Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudica-
tive Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV 213 (1990) (book review) [hereinafter Bone, Per-
sonal and Impersonal Litigative Forms]; Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the “Day in Court” 
Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992) [hereinafter Bone, Re-
thinking]; Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a 
World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1993) [hereinafter Bone, Statistical 
Adjudication]; David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice 
by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561 (1987) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Individual Justice 
by Collective Means]; David Rosenberg, Doing Individual Justice and Collectivizing 
Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1996) [hereinafter 
Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing]; David Rosenberg, Comment, Of End 
Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. 
REV. 695 (1989) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Lessons from a Special Master]. 
 20. See Christenson, supra note 5, at 225; see also CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 
5, at 1-28. 
 21. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 122 (interpretive process—applying 
general language of norm to concrete cases—is characteristic of all legal norms which 
in U.S. legal system the judiciary is major player while international system does “not 
have the benefit of much judicial assistance”). 
 22. See Koh, supra note 18, at 2353 (resulting transnational body of law that 
blends domestic and international law, as opposed to dualistic view of law). “Robert C. 
Clark argues that parallel developments on the domestic scene have created a demand 
for the ‘potentially enormous’ contribution of law and lawyers in ‘stabilizing expecta-
tions and reducing the transaction costs of later misunderstandings, conflicts and dis-
pute resolution.’ ” CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 123-24. 
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Part I of the article briefly describes the recent history of 
class action suits brought on behalf of human rights victims 
against corporations, exploring more closely how Rule 23’s pro-
cedural mechanisms are applied to human rights plaintiffs as a 
practical matter. Part II identifies the role of class action suits 
in the evolution of human rights law from a focus on individual 
rights to a focus on collective rights, particularly the cultural 
and economic rights of groups. This part explores how the 
structure of the class suit provides a means for developing new 
substantive international law norms through the judicial pro-
nouncement of class definitions. Part III discusses the collec-
tive remedies that are most appropriate for human rights 
classes and best satisfy the objectives of human rights law, 
such as developing collective rights upon which claims may be 
found and allowing victims a voice in the international com-
munity. Part IV reviews the lack of enforcement of human 
rights laws against corporations acting in the global economy 
and argues that compliance is achieved by permitting individu-
als access to transnational litigation through class action suits. 
Part V argues that, in practice and theory, the objectives of 
human rights law justify collective treatment of human rights 
claims. Collective adjudication does not compromise rights of 
class members under rights-based theories of participation, or 
under human rights law. This article concludes that the United 
States federal courts play a crucial role in the development of 
procedural and substantive international law, as well as in the 
enforcement of those norms through the class action litigation 
of international human rights violations against private corpo-
rations. 
I. THE RISING ROLE OF THE CLASS ACTION IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
LITIGATION 
A. Human Rights as a Source of Law in U.S. Courts 
There is no requirement in international law that countries 
provide remedies for individuals whose rights have been vio-
lated.23 Since 1980, however, private persons have sought re-
 
 23. The general rule is that the States afford foreigners access to the courts—but 
not specifically for international law. See SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 240-41. In some 
cases, a  State is explicitly or implicitly obliged to provide legislation and/or remedies 
in domestic courts for individuals adversely affected by a treaty violation. See id. A 
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dress in U.S. federal courts for human rights violations.24 Thus, 
the enforcement of international human rights law through 
private causes of action in U.S. courts is an exception to the ba-
sic postulate of international law that obligations run from the 
state to other states or organizations of states.25 
Human rights law has revolutionized the field of interna-
tional law.26 In the nineteenth century, human beings were not 
recognized under international law; their rights were derived 
from the rights of states. What the state did to its own citizens 
within its own territory was a matter of “domestic jurisdiction,” 
a private law concept.27 After World War II, the idea of interna-
tional human rights law was universally acknowledged, as evi-
denced by the ratification by forty-eight countries of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.28 Enforcement of 
 
State may meet its obligation through executive or other non-judicial means. See id. 
 24. See SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 240. It is more difficult to determine 
whether international CIL rules require domestic judicial remedies for individuals. 
 25. See JAMES L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 1 (1996) (describing interna-
tional law as a “body of rules and principles of action which are binding upon civilized 
states in their relations with one another”). An example is the Iran-U.S. arbitral tribu-
nal in the Hague, created in 1981 as part of the settlement following the Tehran hos-
tage crisis where U.S. nationals could bring claims against Iran without intercession by 
the U.S. government. See SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 239-40. 
 26. There are three sources of international law: “1) international agreements, 2) 
CIL, and 3) general principles of law.” Statute of International Court of Justice, Art. 38 
(1). “In theory, these sources are of equal weight. . . . however, the best accepted 
sources of what is international law are international agreements. . . . International 
agreements [may include] treaties, conventions, concordants, and exchanges of notes.” 
BORN, supra note 5, at 18. U.S. courts distinguish between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties as a source of private rights in federal law. See id. at 19. “A self-
executing treaty has immediate legal effect within the contracting States, without the 
need for implementing legislation or regulations; a non-self-executing treaty is not in-
tended to have direct legal effect, but instead contemplates domestic enabling legisla-
tion.” Id. at 19-20; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(3) & 
(4) & cmt. h (1987). 
 27. See Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over Inter-
national Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filàrtiga v. Peña-
Irala, in THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY 70-74 (Ralph G. 
Steinhardt & Anthony D’Amato eds., 1999). 
 28. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., pt. 1 U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Standard of Achievement (visited Aug. 9, 1999) 
<http://www.udhr50.org/history/default.htm>. “The Universal Declaration was not in-
tended as a binding instrument, and there is no persuasive argument that article 25 is 
CIL. However, similar provisions have become part of other instruments that are in-
tended to be binding, most prominently the International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights.” Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human 
Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1382 (1999). 
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international human rights law began with Nuremberg,29 
which recognized crimes against humanity and began a form of 
politics that favored intervention on behalf of individual rights, 
even when violations of those rights occurred within the 
boundaries of sovereign states.30 The body of international hu-
man rights law since World War II has “established the princi-
ple that international law limits a State’s treatment of its own 
nationals.”31 This international norm paved the way for de-
tailed statements of internationally protected rights.32 
There is great debate over whether human rights law be-
come part of CIL.33 This is, in part, because of the difficulty of 
even defining CIL and human rights. International human 
rights law has been subject to little judicial interpretation. In-
deed, a precise definition of human rights in general is widely 
debated.34 CIL is a dynamic body of law, evolving with the in-
 
 29. The Nuremberg trials and the Genocide Convention effectively destroyed the 
earlier classic conception. See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 61 
(Anthony D’Amato and Kirsten Engel, eds., 1996). 
 30. See David Luban, The Legacies of Nuremberg, 54 SOC. RESEARCH 779, 787 
(1987) (noting the counter pull toward statism); see also Ted Baggett, Recent Develop-
ment, Human Rights Abuses in Yugoslavia: To Bring an End to Political Oppression, 
the International Community Should Assist in Establishing an Independent Kosovo, 27 
GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 457 (1999) (discussing human rights as the impetus for inter-
vention). 
 31. Stephens, supra note 13, at 588. See also BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL 
RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 58-89 (1996) (dis-
cussing seven international torts which fall under the ATCA).  
 32. See Draft International Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/777 (Dec. 
7, 1948) [hereinafter U.N. Declaration]. 
 33. SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 335. 
 34. See Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976), disavowed by Filàr-
tiga  v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (“There has been little judicial interpre-
tation of what constitutes the law of nations and no universally accepted definition of 
this phrase.”); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (discussing the 
lack of precedent interpreting the ATCA, especially with respect to the term “law of 
nations”). The U.S. Supreme Court has not reviewed the modern use of ATCA as the 
basis for human rights liability. The First and Second Circuits accept the fluid defini-
tion set forth in Filàrtiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) and Argentine Re-
public v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989). This is contrasted with 
the intra-circuit disagreement among three concurring judges in Tel-Oren v. Libyan 
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 779-80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam). The Fifth Circuit 
dodged the issue of determining proper definition for law of nations in Carmichael v. 
United Techs. Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (1988) (affirming dismissal of a British national’s 
allegation under ATCA of torture and imprisonment in Saudi Arabia). The Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuits have not addressed the issue, although both courts seem to be on the 
Filàrtiga/Kadic sideline. See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 
1994); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996). 
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ternational community and its consciousness.35 The changing 
nature of CIL is in part due to its definition, which is both ob-
jective (State practice), as well as subjective (opinio juris, or the 
legal and moral expectations of society).36 Finding sufficient 
evidence of State practice and opinio juris for a CIL norm re-
quires courts to delve into nontraditional analysis. Courts con-
sider whether the norm is incorporated in national constitu-
tions and laws and whether it is frequently referred to in U.N. 
resolutions and declarations condemning specific human rights 
violations.37 Statements by national officials criticizing other 
States for serious human rights violations, “dictum of the In-
ternational Court of Justice that obligations erga omnes in in-
ternational law include those derived ‘from the principles and 
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person,’ [and] 
some [international court] . . . decisions . . . that refer to the 
Universal Declaration as a source of standards for judicial de-
cision[s]” are sufficient evidence of the existence of a CIL 
norm.38 
Where domestic legal systems do provide remedies for vio-
lations of international law (either by their constitution or 
common or statutory law declaring CIL part of domestic law), 
international human rights law is said to be “internalized” or 
“incorporated” into domestic law.39 Heated debate has erupted 
 
 35. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the impor-
tance of using “evolving standards of international law” when considering scope of 
ATCA’s coverage); Filàrtiga, 630 F.2d at 887 (reasoning that jurisdictional questions 
“ ‘must be considered part of an organic growth—part of the evolutionary process’ ” 
(quoting Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360 (1959)). 
But see Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 813 (Bork, J., concurring) (“[I]n 1789 there was no con-
cept of international human rights.”); id. at 789 (Edwards, J., concurring) (intimating a 
degree of judicial progressiveness by citing the Supreme Court’s determination in 1887 
that counterfeiting was a violation of the law of nations in U.S. v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 
(1887), but not adopting the Second Circuit’s views). 
 36. See SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 338. 
 37. See id. at 336-37. 
 38. Id. at 336 (quoting 1970 I.C.J. 33). The U.N. Charter, to which virtually all 
States adhere, includes a “pledge” to act “for the achievement of inter alia, ‘universal 
respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms for all without distinctions 
to race, sex, language or religion.’ ” See id. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948 was followed 20 years later by the two international covenants on human 
rights. See id. A body of law exists specifying human rights obligations in detail and 
providing means of “implementation” to bring about compliance; however, neither gov-
ernments nor courts have accepted the Universal Declaration as an instrument with 
obligatory force. See id. at 337. 
 39. See Edward M. Morgan, Internalization of Customary International Law: An 
Historical Perspective, 12 YALE J. INT’L L. 63 (1987). With treaties, incorporation de-
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over the very existence of international human rights law as 
part of federal common law, upon which human rights victims 
may ground their claims in U.S. courts.40 The history of grant-
ing relief to alien plaintiffs under international human rights 
law in the United States began with the 1980 Filartiga v. Peña-
Irala case. In Filartiga, the Second Circuit revived the two-
hundred-year-old Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) to find federal 
court jurisdiction over a suit by an alien against a Paraguayan 
government official for torture committed in Paraguay.41 The 
Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs could sue the official 
under ATCA because torture violated CIL.42 After Filartiga, 
other human rights victims sued foreign governments and offi-
cials in U.S. courts for offenses such as genocide, torture, sum-
mary execution, and disappearances, all of which are consid-
ered violations of the “law of nations.”43 It became settled that 
 
pends on whether the treaties are “self executing” and therefore readily capable of di-
rect application by a court without legislation. See BORN supra note 5, at 19-20. Some 
countries’ constitutions, such as Austria, Germany, and Italy’s, expressly provide that 
CIL is part of domestic law “on the same footing as statutes,” but subject to constitu-
tional precepts. SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 242; Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 27 
(discussing the readiness of some courts (the U.S. courts specifically) to grant private 
rights of actions for international human rights). 
 40. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, CIL as Federal Common Law: A 
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley & 
Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998) [hereinafter Federal Courts]; Ryan Goodman & Derek P. 
Jinks, Filàrtiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common 
Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997). 
 41. See Filàrtiga  v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877-78 (2d Cir. 1980); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998). 
 42.  See Filàrtiga, 630 F.2d at 884. 
 43. See, e.g., Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (dismissing a Holo-
caust survivor’s suit for money damages pursuant to the Federal Sovereign Immunities 
Act); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (nine Gautemalan nationals 
brought suit against former general and defense minister for atrocities committed un-
der his command); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (dismissing 
claims for money damages sought by widow of political opponent of exiled President 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti due to head-of-state immunity); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987) (including “(a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave 
trade, (c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary deten-
tion, (f) systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations 
of internationally recognized human rights”); U.N. Declaration, supra note 32; Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 222; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, rev. 1; Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 
1292 (1975); American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, signed May 2, 
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foreign states and officials were bound by CIL, for which the 
Act provides jurisdiction.44 
Since Filartiga, human rights plaintiffs have encountered 
substantial procedural obstacles in suits against corrupt gov-
ernments or government officials, including immunity doc-
trines such as head-of-state and sovereign immunity,45 the act 
of state doctrine,46 forum non conveniens,47 and the virtual im-
 
1948, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6. 
 44. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Estate of Ferdinand 
Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 500 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 
(11th Cir. 1996); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), 
aff’d, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (discussing the debate among circuits 
over subject matter jurisdiction versus private right of action); Federal Courts, supra 
note 40, at 2262-67. 
 45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1994) (the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976); 
Siderman de Blake v. Argentina 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) (action for torture and 
expropriation against Argentina based on commercial activity exception to FSIA and 
implied waiver of immunity); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 885-86 (C.D. Cal. 
1997) (citing Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993)). The late Professor Lil-
lich noted, “The courts repeatedly have rejected arguments that a ‘human rights’ or ‘jus 
cogens’ exception to the FSIA exists, most recently giving them an ‘ignominious bur-
ial’ ” in Princz v. F.R.G. Richard B. Lillich, The Growing Importance of Customary In-
ternational Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 27 (1995/1996); see 
Princz v. F.R.G., 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing jus cogens); see also Smith v. 
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 244-45 (2d Cir. 1996) (dis-
missing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a suit brought by representative of vic-
tims of Pan American Flight 103 bombing against government of Libya). But see Hilao 
v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that state actors may 
not hide behind FSIA when their actions exceed scope of their authority); Hari M. 
Osofsky, Foreign Sovereign Immunity From Severe Human Rights Violations: New Di-
rections for Common Law Based Approaches, 11 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 35, 44-45 (1998); 
Jeffrey Rabkin, Note, Universal Justice: The Role of Federal Courts in International 
Civil Litigation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2120, 2132, 2152 (1995) (arguing both that the 
FSIA does not mandate dismissal of ATCA claims brought against individuals who 
have violated “fundamental norms of international law” regardless of whether individ-
ual is state actor and that jus cogens norms should serve as guide to what constitutes 
implied waiver under FSIA); Recent Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 513, 518 (criticizing the 
Princz court’s decision as exceedingly narrow regarding federal jurisdiction over foreign 
sovereign). 
 46. See Philippines v. Marcos II, 862 F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1988); 
SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 243-44 (the Act of State Doctrine in the U.S. “accords a 
conclusive presumption of validity to the foreign Act of State (excluding . . . exceptions . 
. . )” even if it contravenes CIL); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 
U.S. 398 (1964) (rationale includes respect for sovereignty of States in matters over 
which they have territorial jurisdiction). Deference to sovereign acts of foreign States 
may not be defensible, however, where CIL clearly prohibits acts such as genocide, sys-
tematic racial discrimination, or arbitrary and discriminatory seizures of property. See 
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 894 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (stating in dicta that act of 
state doctrine would not preclude suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 given the high degree of 
international consensus that jus cogens norm violations are internationally denounced, 
undermining the defendant’s arguments that SLORC and MOGE activities should be 
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possibility of enforcing judgments.48 Domestic courts have also 
been reticent to give relief to private persons injured by acts of 
a government that contravened international obligations vis-à-
vis sovereign states, such as those prohibiting use of force 
against another state or requiring compliance with mandatory 
decisions of the U.N. Security Council.49 
However, U.S. courts for the most part have incorporated 
CIL into the federal common law.50 The question, then, is to 
what extent the courts may participate in the development of 
substantive rights and obligations under CIL in their applica-
tion of procedural rules. This article addresses this question. 
B. Recognizing a Human Rights Class Action 
Groups of human rights plaintiffs now stand to influence, 
and potentially benefit from, the development of federal court 
 
treated as acts of the state). 
 47. See Kathryn Lee Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non 
Conveniens in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 41, 44-46 (1998); cf. 
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 99-7223 (2d Cir. filed June 1, 1999) (citing 
“‘Order’ (AI-19)” S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1998, which dismissed ATCA case against foreign 
corporations on grounds of forum non conveniens); Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 
(2d Cir. 1998); Brief for Defendants-Appellees-Cross Appellants, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 08386 (KMW) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1996). 
 48. To address this problem, thirty-five countries have been negotiating the Con-
vention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Foreign Judgments under the auspices 
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law since 1993. The Hague Confer-
ence must approve, and the United States must sign, the Convention. See Memoran-
dum from Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld to The Council through Professor Geoffrey 
Hazard Re: Proposal for Project on Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention 1 (Nov. 30, 
1998), available at <http://www.ali.org/ali/1999_Lowen1.htm> (visited June 16, 1999) . 
 49. U.S. courts have concluded that these are political questions. See 
SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 242-43; see, e.g., U.S. v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336, 342 
(D. Md. 1968). 
 50. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 66 
(New York, Harper & Bros. 1854) (“[T]he law of nations . . . is here adopted in its full 
extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land.”). In Kadic, 
the Court declined to extend 28 U.S.C. § 1331 jurisdiction to encompass all alleged vio-
lations of international law, therefore leaving an unresolved relationship between sec-
tion 1331 and violations of “law of nations.” See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d 
Cir. 1995); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 779-80 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (asserting that § 1331 requires an express or implied 
remedy from the law of nations but that §1350 provides jurisdiction over violations of 
the law of nations). The courts in Filartiga and Kadic dodged the issue by noting that 
since the ATCA apparently provided the appellants a remedy, there was no need to de-
cide whether a non-statutory based claim of international law violations should be in-
corporated into U.S. law under § 1331. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 246; Filàrtiga  v. Peña-
Irala , 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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class adjudication. For example, the class action brought on 
behalf of almost ten thousand human rights victims in the 
Philippines during martial law under Ferdinand Marcos re-
sulted in a settlement of $1.2 billion in exemplary damages and 
$766 million in compensatory damages.51 In the first phase of 
the jury trial, the representative plaintiffs established that 
Marcos was liable to the class for torture, summary executions, 
and disappearances through a statistical expert’s testimony re-
garding the extent of the human rights violations based on a 
sampling of victims in the Philippines.52 
Similarly, the Second Circuit held that Radovan Karadzic 
was liable as an individual to the class who brought an action 
against Karadzic for international wrongs, thus identifying 
non-state individuals as potential defendants in human rights 
class action suits.53 In the case against Karadzic, Croat and 
Muslim citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina brought suit under 
ATCA for genocide, war crimes, and other crimes against hu-
manity, 54 alleging they were victims or survivors of victims of 
Karadzic’s campaign of ethnic cleansing. After the Second Cir-
cuit held that Karadzic was subject to suit under ATCA in his 
private capacity, the district court on remand certified the class 
and has proceeded into discovery despite challenges to the 
class.55 
Following Kadic, class actions against corporate entities for 
 
 51. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 52. See generally, Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Sampling Damages, 83 
IOWA L. REV. 545, 548-49 (1998). 
 53. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-44 (stating that Bosnian-Serb leader may be found 
liable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in his private capacity); 
Alan Frederick Enslen, Commentary, Filàrtiga’s Offspring: The Second Circuit Signifi-
cantly Expands the Scope of the Alien Tort Claims Act with Its Decision in Kadic v. 
Karadzic, 48 ALA. L. REV. 695 (1997); Lawrence Newman & Michael Burrows, Interna-
tional Litigation: The Alien Tort Claims Act, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 29, 1995, at 3. In 1988, the 
Fifth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the ATCA conferred subject matter juris-
diction over private entities who conspired in official acts of torture by one nation 
against a citizen of another. See Carmichael v. United Tech. Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (dismissing suit by British plaintiff against American employer for failure to 
show that employer had conspired with Saudi Arabia against him). The D.C. Circuit 
had previously held that the ATCA did not cover the conduct of non-state actors. See 
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 
775 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
 54. See Doe v. Karadzic, 176 F.R.D. 458, 460 (S.D.N.Y 1997). 
 55. See Doe v. Karadzic, No. 93 CIV. 0878, 1999 WL 6360 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1999) 
(denying motion to certify decision to deny opt out rights for interlocutory appeal); Doe 
v. Karadzic, 182 F.R.D. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying plaintiff’s motion to opt out of 
23(b)(1)(B) class). 
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human rights abuses have been brought in two principle areas: 
1) human rights violations related to environmental harm 
caused by multinational corporations acting with foreign gov-
ernments;56 and 2) human rights violations by foreign banks 
and corporations acting with the Nazi government during the 
Holocaust.57 
In 1996, on the heels of Kadic, Burmese farmers brought a 
class action suit in federal court against Unocal, Total S.A., a 
French petroleum company, the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enter-
prise (MOGE), the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC), and individual executives of Unocal.58 Plaintiffs 
sought injunctive, declaratory, and compensatory relief for in-
ternational human rights violations (forced labor, crimes 
against humanity, torture, violence against women, arbitrary 
arrest and detention, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment) committed in furtherance of the defendants’ Yadana gas 
pipeline project.59 
Also in 1996, nearly 900,000 victims and survivors of the 
Holocaust filed a class action suit against the three largest 
Swiss banks alleging that the banks participated with the Nazi 
 
 56. See e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 366, 369 (E.D. 
La. 1997) (on appeal) (involving leader of Indonesian tribe who brought suit against a 
subsidiary of a U.S. corporation that operates copper, gold, and silver mines in Irian 
Jaya, Indonesia, alleging human rights and international environmental law violations 
and violations by security personnel at Freeport’s mine which included torture, execu-
tion, arrests and detentions, and international environmental torts); Aguinda v. Tex-
aco, Inc. No. 93 Civ. 7527 (VLB), 1994 WL 142006 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994), dismissed, 
945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing action based on international comity, fo-
rum non conveniens, and failure to join an indispensable party), and vacated sub nom., 
Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998). The Amungme people also filed a class 
action suit in Louisiana district court alleging Freeport “engaged in human rights vio-
lations, cultural genocide, and environmental violations through its corporate policies 
and conduct at the Grasberg Mine, located in Irian Jaya, Indonesia.” Alomang v. Free-
port-McMoRan, Inc., No. 96-CA-2139, 1996 WL 601431, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 1996). 
The federal district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
rejected the defendant’s attempt to consolidate the action with Beanal, and remanded 
the action to state court. See id. at *9-*10. 
 57. See supra note 3. 
 58. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal. 1997); see Eileen Rice, 
Doe v. Unocal Corporation: Corporate Liability for International Human Rights Viola-
tions, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 153, 153-54 (1998). 
 59. Plaintiffs alleged that in building offshore drilling stations to extract natural 
gas, the defendants, through SLORC military, intelligence, and police forces, used vio-
lence and intimidation to relocate entire villages, enslave armies living in areas where 
the pipeline was to be installed, and stole farmers’ property. Plaintiffs’ claimed they 
had “suffer[ed] death of family members, assault, rape and other torture, forced labor, 
and the loss of their homes and property.” Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 883. 
BOYD-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:18 AM 
1156 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
Regime in plundering the assets of the victims, concealed as-
sets on deposit prior to 1945, and knowingly participated in 
maintaining profits from slave labor under the auspices of the 
Nazi Regime.60 The case settled in late 1998 for $1.2 billion, 
and notice and distribution of the settlement proceeds to the 
class members continues today.61 The class settlement in the 
Swiss bank cases involves worldwide notice to over 900,000 
claimants making up subclasses of victims including Jews, Je-
hovah’s Witnesses, gypsies, homosexuals, and the disabled. 
Now new classes of plaintiffs have filed suits alleging they 
were targets of Nazi persecution and were forced by corporate 
defendants to perform slave labor during the Holocaust.62 
Other classes have filed similar actions, alleging that German 
 
 60. See Memorandum of Law Submitted by Burt Neuborne, In re Holocaust Vic-
tim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 1997) [hereinafter Neuborne Memoran-
dum]; Letter from Cohen, Milstein Hausfeld & Toll to Potential Class Members of 
Holocaust-Related Litigation (Apr. 20, 1999) (on file with author). The Swiss banks 
were described by plaintiffs as the “principle means of the liquidation, disposal and 
conversion of that wealth into currencies usable by Nazi Germany to purchase its nec-
essary war materials and conduct its extermination of the Jews.” Id. Banks allegedly 
knowingly acted as receivers of looted property obtained in commission of “war crimes” 
and therefore permitted the final consummation of the plunder, knowing that it would 
be converted into foreign currency to buy war materials. See Transcript of Civil Cause 
for Oral Arguments, In re Holocaust Victims Assets CV-96-4849, CV-96-5161, CV-97-
461 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 1997). 
 61. See Settlement Agreement at 9, 13-14, In re Holocaust Victims Assets, No. 
CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y., Settlement Jan. 26, 1999). 
 62. For recent cases filed by Holocaust plaintiffs, see supra notes 2, 3. An esti-
mated 8 to 10 million people worked as slave laborers in German factories of which ap-
proximately 700,000 are still alive. See John Authers et al., Unsettled Business, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Aug. 25, 1998, at 14; German Ex-Slave Workers Plan Action, AP 
ONLINE, Nov. 6, 1998, available in 1998 WL 22415808; Ian Traynor, Schroder Tries to 
Hammer Out Settlement for Slave Labourers, THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 23, 1998, 
at 19 (describing a campaign to sue German and Austrian firms that benefitted from 
slave labor during the Second World War, including: Siemens, BMW, Volkswagen, 
Daimler-Benz, MAN, and Phillip Holzmann, as well as two Austrian groups—Voest 
and Steyr-Daimler-Puch). It is estimated that the number of firms against whom alle-
gations have been or will be filed may reach 100. See Class Action Complaint and Jury 
Demand at ¶ 35, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98-CV-959 (D.N.J. filed Mar. 4, 1998) 
(class action on behalf of all persons who were compelled to perform forced labor in in-
human conditions for Ford Werke A.G. between 1941-1945); Companies and The Holo-
caust: Industrial Actions, ECONOMIST, Nov. 14, 1998, at 75. Plaintiffs seek disgorge-
ment of all economic benefits that accrued to the defendants as a consequence of 
plaintiffs’ forced labor and compensation for the reasonable value of plaintiffs’ services 
and damages for inhuman conditions. Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶¶ 
38-41, Iwanowa, No. 98-CV-959. Factual allegations include collaboration with the Na-
zis in safeguarding profits for Ford Company and supporting military operations with 
trucks; cf. Class Action Complaint, Pollack v. Siemens AG, No. 98-5499 (E.D.N.Y filed 
Aug. 30, 1999). 
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banks, including Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank, accepted 
their stolen money and property, handed over their assets to 
the Nazis, and financed the building of concentration camps 
and companies that employed slave labor.63 Individual Ger-
mans, including Siemens, Krupp, Henkel, Degussa, and Volks-
wagen, have also been individually targeted for allegedly em-
ploying slave labor during the Nazi Regime.64 Separate class 
actions have also been filed against Austrian and French 
banks, alleging that they accepted stolen assets from, and gave 
Jews’ and others’ assets to, the Nazis.65 In addition, class action 
suits have been filed against foreign insurance companies. For 
example, one class action alleges that Assicurazioni Generali 
refused to pay on life insurance policies owned by victims of the 
Holocaust.66 
This metamorphosis of the class action into a human rights 
law enforcement mechanism requires courts to examine Rule 
23 on a deeper level. 
C. Certifying Human Rights Classes under Rule 23(a) 
 Human rights plaintiffs sue corporate defendants as a 
class pursuant to the class action joinder device, which device 
is not available in other domestic courts.67 The class action is 
an anomalous procedural mechanism that treats a large group 
of persons as a single unit for the purpose of litigation.68 The 
 
 63. See Simon Wiesenthal Ctr. v. Deutsche Bank AG, BC-302420, (S.F. Sup. Ct. 
filed Mar. 31, 1999). 
 64. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
 65. Settlements are currently pending with the French banks. See Frederic Bi-
chon, French Banks Craft Accord on Jewish Assets, Agence France-Presse, Mar. 24, 
1999, available in 1999 WL 2569848. 
 66. See Notice of Removal of Action, Friedman v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., 
No. 98-5780, (C.D. Cal. filed July 17, 1998). 
 67. See Detlev F.Vagts, Restitution for Historic Wrongs, the American Courts and 
International Law, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 232, 234 (1998) (“The American class action finds 
no counterpart in other countries and the mass judgments that result from the current 
actions will be seen as crude solutions to complex problems.”); see also Richard B. Cap-
palli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe? A Preliminary Inquiry, 
6 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 217, 280 (1992) (distinguishing the class action experiences 
in other countries “in which a public body or collective association activates the process 
and does not fully assert the rights of all members of the injured class as by ‘fluid re-
covery’ ”); John G. Fleming, Mass Torts, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 507, 521-24 (1994) (distin-
guishing class action models of joinder and consolidation in Canada, Australia, Eng-
land, Switzerland, France, Germany, Belgium, and Greece, as not having binding 
effects on all parties). 
 68. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 8. 
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modern class action suit is a result of the creation of Rule 23 in 
the 1966 revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.69 
Rule 23(a) permits the joinder of parties as a class if: 1) the 
parties are too numerous to be joined individually (numeros-
ity); 2) common questions of law or fact exist within the class 
(commonality); 3) the class representatives have claims typical 
of the class (typicality); and 4) the class representatives ade-
quately represent the class’s interests (adequacy of representa-
tion).70 In addition to satisfying the above criteria, a class ac-
tion must fall into one of the three categories defined in 
subsection (b) of Rule 23. Subsection (b) sets forth the type of 
class remedy most appropriate given the defendants’ resources, 
the class’s allegations of harm, and the plaintiffs’ requests for 
relief.71 
1. Numerosity 
The numerosity requirement is usually satisfied when there 
are a large number of injured parties.72 In both Kadic and Mar-
cos, for example, tens of thousands of alleged victims were 
joined as a class because they claimed to have been targeted by 
a common defendant on a massive scale.73 Similarly, in actions 
brought against foreign corporate activity, large numbers of 
plaintiffs alleged similar wide-spread harm.74 The alleged harm 
 
 69. The drafters of the revised rule indicated that they had recast “in more prac-
tical terms the occasions for maintaining class actions.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 
(amended 1966) (West 1992). 
 70. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 1-2 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (West 1992)). 
 71. The first type of action defined in Rule 23(b)(1)(A) is a mass-production ver-
sion of Rule 19, the necessary-parties rule. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1). Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 
allows for certification where there is a limited fund from which to compensate plain-
tiffs, and an individual member’s recovery may preclude recovery for other members. 
See id. The bulk of the cases involves, and most of the controversy surrounds, the re-
maining two classifications. Rule 23(b)(2), which has accounted for the largest number 
of class actions, applies to situations in which primarily injunctive or declaratory relief 
is sought. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). Rule 23(b)(3) is available if the case neither satisfies 
23(b)(1) nor (b)(2) and the court, after determining whether the common interests of 
the members predominate over individual interests, concludes that “a class action is 
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the contro-
versy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The (b)(3) category is available to a class seeking 
money damages. See id.; YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 246-47. The types of remedies 
most appropriate for a class of human rights plaintiffs will be discussed further in Part 
III. 
 72. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. 
 73. See Doe v. Karadzic, 176 F.R.D. 458, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 74. See Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶ 20, Snopczyk v. Volks-
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often has an economic as well as physical element, such as 
when an entire indigenous group is displaced or prevented 
from enjoying the profits of the land due to environmental 
damage,75 or an ethnic group is forced to work in corporate fac-
tories in subhuman conditions and denied profits or wages from 
the work.76 Accordingly, the numerosity requirement should be 
satisfied in an action where the plaintiffs assert human rights 
abuses against a common defendant. 
2. Commonality 
In order to satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 
23(a), there must be a definable group alleging a campaign or 
policy of human rights abuses.77 Classes of human rights plain-
tiffs share a common status as members of an ethnic minority 
group that has been the target of the alleged harm.78 Their 
status as group members at the time of the harm is a common 
question of fact to all members of the class. Frequently, mem-
bers of ethnic minorities bear two or more defining characteris-
tics.79 Objectively, the group at issue must constitute a “non-
 
wagen A.G., No. 99-CV-0472 (E.D. Wis. filed May 5, 1999) (alleging 350-400 children 
perished at defendant’s kinderheim); Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶ 1, 
Hirsch v. Fried. Krupp A.G. Hoesch-Krupp, No. 98-DV-4280 (D.N.J. filed Sept. 11, 
1998); Class Action and Complaint at ¶ 1, Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98-CV-959 
(D.N.J. filed Mar. 4, 1998) (alleging thousands were compelled to perform slave labor). 
 75. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 382 (E.D. La. 1997) 
(the plaintiffs alleged that the corporation’s practices “have resulted in environmental 
destruction with human costs to the indigenous people,” but the court held that the al-
legations did not state an actionable environmental tort). 
 76. See Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 9-10, 21, Hirsch, No. 98-CV-4280; Complaint at ¶¶ 1-
2, 8, 10, 12, Iwanowa, No. 98-CV-959; Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 53-55, 69; Complaint, Pollack 
v. Siemens AG, No. 98-CV-5499 (E.D.N.Y filed Aug. 30, 1999). 
 77. Steinhardt, supra note 19, at 65. The Marcos litigation was the “first class 
action to view human rights abuses in effect as mass torts, in which the plaintiffs es-
tablish that they are victims of a single orchestrated and illegal policy.” Id. at 68. 
Steinhardt identified problems with human rights class actions and advocated the 
creation of an “international convention for the redress of human rights violations.” Id. 
at 69. 
 78. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CONTEXT 987-88 (1996). The book addresses minority groups that are typically ethnic, 
racial, religious, linguistic, or national origin in character. “Ethnic” is used as a short-
hand reference to all such minorities, whatever their distinctive characteristic. The 
“term embraces groups as diverse as Muslims of North African background in France, 
blacks and Jews in the United States, Gypsies in Hungary, Kurds in Iraq or Turkey, 
[and] Russians in Georgia.” Id. 
 79. “No authoritative instrument . . . imposes a definition” of “minorities” within 
the discourse of international law, and to some degree it is politically disputed. Id. at 
988. 
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dominant minority of the population . . . and its members must 
share distinctive characteristics such as race, religion or lan-
guage. . . . Subjectively, members of this group must . . . evi-
dence a sense of belonging to the group, and evidence the desire 
to continue as a distinctive group.” 80 
The commonality requirement may be satisfied by a num-
ber of common questions of law or fact. Claims of international 
human rights abuses present a common question of law under 
the jurisdictional elements of the ATCA, the primary basis for 
subject matter jurisdiction for human rights abuses.81 The 
ATCA requires a court to identify a CIL norm and determine 
whether a plaintiff has sufficiently pled a “tort,” or violation of 
the identifiable human right norm. This determination is a 
question of law that is common to the human rights class.82 
Federal courts must wrestle with whether the alleged corporate 
conduct implicates, and ultimately violates, a CIL norm.83 In 
Karadzic, for example, the common questions included whether 
the defendant violated CIL by instructing the troops to rape, 
murder, and abuse and whether he acted with intent to destroy 
an ethnic or religious group, thereby committing genocide, a 
clear violation of human rights law.84 
Whether the corporation, as a private actor, is bound by the 
CIL norm is another common question of law.85 Human rights 
 
 80. See id. 
 81. See Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 3-5. 
 82. The court must determine whether there is an applicable norm of interna-
tional law, whether it is recognized by the U.S., what its status is, and whether it has 
been violated. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 890 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (citing In 
re Estate of Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 500-502 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that official torture 
is a jus cogens norm)). 
 83. See SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 335-38. 
 84. See Doe v. Karadzic, 176 F.R.D. 458, 461-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 85. The legal issue of private actor liability for violation of international law has 
been addressed. See Sanchez Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(dismissing plaintiffs’ claims of torture and rape against Nicaraguan Contras because 
court was “aware of no treaty that purports to make the activities at issue unlawful 
when conducted by private individuals. As for the law of nations—so called ‘CIL’. . . we 
conclude that this also does not reach private, non-state conduct of this sort.”); 
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) 
(Edwards, J., concurring) (stating that the PLO, as a non-state actor and not recog-
nized as a member of the community of nations, had, at most, committed obscure viola-
tions of international law for which the PLO could not be held liable). The application 
of CIL to non-state actors has been discussed elsewhere and is beyond the scope of this 
article. See, e.g., Justin Lu, Jurisdiction over Non-State Activity Under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 531 (1997); Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 7-12. 
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plaintiffs alleging that the ATCA has been violated by corpo-
rate defendants acting in concert with corrupt governments 
also present common questions of fact regarding whether the 
private actors’ conduct violates CIL.86 In Kadic, a common 
question of fact was whether the defendant, the self-proclaimed 
president of an unrecognized Bosnian-Serb entity, violated the 
law of nations with respect to all plaintiffs by engaging in 
genocide, war crimes, torture, and summary executions.87 
The threshold requirement of commonality has been char-
acterized as the “common sense approach that the class is 
united by a common interest in determining whether a defen-
dant’s course of conduct is in its broad outlines actionable.”88 
Accordingly, where human rights plaintiffs allege that the de-
fendant engaged in common course of conduct toward the 
plaintiffs, the commonality requirement should be satisfied. 
Moreover, slight differences in class members’ positions should 
not defeat the commonality requirement.89 
3. Typicality 
The analysis of typicality overlaps with the commonality 
analysis in that it goes directly to the existence of a common 
question that makes combined litigation appropriate in the 
first place.90 The typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) in-
quires whether the named plaintiff is the right person to bring 
suit on behalf of the class.91 The “class representative must . . . 
 
 86. See Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand at ¶ 32, Iwanowa v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., No. 98-CV-959 (D.N.J. filed Mar. 4, 1998) (citing common questions, including 
whether defendants compelled plaintiffs to perform forced labor; were unjustly en-
riched by their conduct; whether they violated law of nations; and whether Ford Motor 
Company is liable for wrongful conduct of Ford Werke A.G.). Finding corporate defen-
dants liable under the ATCA has expanded the reach of international law. See Ariadne 
K. Sacharoff, Note, Multinationals in Host Countries: Can They Be Held Liabile Under 
the Alien Tort Claims Act for Human Rights Violations?, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 927, 
n.157 (1998) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 101 (1987) 
(“International law . . . deal[s] with the conduct of states and of international organiza-
tions . . . as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or ju-
ridical.”)). 
 87. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241-44 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 88. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 902 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 89. See In re American Medical Systems, Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1084 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(stating that plaintiffs must allege a “single disaster or single course of conduct” to 
meet the commonality requirement) (quoting Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 
1188, 1196-97 (6th Cir. 1988)). 
 90. See General Tel. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982). 
 91. The underlying issue is what should be done if the plaintiff is not the right 
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‘possess the same interest and suffer the same injury’ as the 
class members.”92 Accordingly, characteristics of the class rep-
resentative are important. Differences in the nature of the 
proof offered on the class claim and the representative’s indi-
vidual claim may lead to a determination that the typicality 
requirement is not met.93 Where the plaintiffs’ claims all arise 
from the same course of alleged corporate conduct, such as act-
ing with a state in the extermination of a collective people, the 
typicality requirement should be satisfied, either directly or in-
directly, by the demonstration of economic harm or slave labor. 
Recent concerns of some courts that variations in state laws 
and causation issues undercut the commonality and typicality 
requirement do not apply to human rights classes.94 Variations 
in state laws are not at issue in cases brought under the ATCA 
for international “torts.”95 An additional concern is that there 
may be several causes of harm in mass product liability cases 
and, thus, typicality may not be present merely because the 
plaintiffs allege a single source of harm. However, unlike typi-
cal mass product liability cases, though the degree and extent 
of harm inflicted on human rights victims varies from person to 
person, the proximate cause of all of the alleged harm is the 
same: the defendant’s course of conduct, from Karadzic’s policy 
of ethnic cleansing and the Swiss banks’ looting of Holocaust 
assets to forced labor by World War II corporations and the de-
struction of indigenous cultures through joint venture pipeline 
projects with foreign governments. 
4. Adequacy of representation 
Finally, before the judgment is binding on all members of 
 
person. One answer is to allow the court and plaintiffs’ counsel to recruit a replace-
ment. See Norman v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 458 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1972); 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.16 (3d ed. 1995). The extent of that duty turns 
on the stage the litigation has reached; courts are less likely to authorize such a re-
cruiting effort at the class certification stage than in cases where, after they have certi-
fied a class, it appears that there is something wrong with the named class representa-
tive. See Payne v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 812-13 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 92. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 156. The named representative personifies the class: she 
“plays client” both before and after trial. See id. 
 93. See id. at 159 n.15; American Medical Systems, 75 F.3d at 1082; In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 94. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740-43 (5th Cir. 1996); 
American Medical Systems, 75 F.3d at 1085; Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1300. 
 95. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 742-43; Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1300-01. 
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the class, the court must determine that the class representa-
tive is “adequate.”96 This determination focuses on the “inter-
ests” of the class and serves to uncover conflicts of interest be-
tween named parties and the class they seek to represent.97 
“The adequacy inquiry tends to merge with the commonality 
and typicality criteria, which serve as guideposts” for determin-
ing whether the class action is economical and whether the 
named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are interrelated 
enough for the “interests of the class members to be fairly and 
adequately protected in their absence.”98 As in the commonality 
and typicality inquiries, intraclass conflicts may cut against 
finding there is adequate representation, although differences 
in strategy or preferences, such as the selection of remedies, 
will not defeat a finding of adequacy.99 
The Kadic court found that the class representative was 
adequate since class counsel was qualified and the class mem-
 
 96. Since Hansberry v. Lee was decided in 1948, the issue of adequate represen-
tation has been elevated to a constitutional safeguard of due process (replacing indi-
vidual opportunity to be heard). See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43-44 (1940); Pat-
rick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 571 
(1997). Courts continue to rely on Hansberry’s due process principle that, with limited 
exceptions, one is not bound by a judgment in litigation to which he is not a party. See 
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S.Ct. 2295, 2301 (1999); Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 40. But 
see Woolley, supra. In Rethinking, Professor Bone argues that the assumption that the 
American system has always given litigants their personal day in court, absent compel-
ling reasons not to, is wrong. Rather, the American system of adjudication has histori-
cally recognized classes of cases in which individuals did not have a strong claim to 
participate. See Rethinking, supra note 19, at 206-31. Part IV will look more closely at 
how this constitutional safeguard squares with collective claims of human rights 
groups on a policy and theory level. 
 97. “[A] class representative must be part of the class and ‘possess the same in-
terest and suffer the same injury’ as the class members.” Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 625-26 (1997) (quoting East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 
431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977)). Professor Yeazell argues that the distinct financial incen-
tives driving (b)(2) and (b)(3) suits result in the two types having different social struc-
tures, which account for the different concepts of representation attached to (b)(2) and 
(b)(3) classes. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 249-66. “Rule 23(b) suggests that interest 
alone suffices to justify a class action brought under subsection (b)(2) but also requires 
consent of the class members in an action brought under subsection (b)(3).” Id. at 252. 
 98. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157 n.13 (1982)). 
“Typicality appears to be a means to the end of adequate representation, while ade-
quate representation of interests appears to be the end itself.” YEAZELL, supra note 19, 
at 251. 
 99. See Robertson v. National Basketball Ass’n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 898-900 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (discussing conflicts between past and present class members, where 
those seeking injunctive relief instead of money damages did not overcome certifica-
tion). 
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bers collectively sought to establish the defendant’s liability.100 
This rather loose inquiry into adequacy did not focus on intra-
class conflicts, even though class members claimed distinct in-
juries, including forced impregnation, rape, torture, and extra-
judicial killings.101 Commonly in human rights cases, 
defendants engage in a policy or scheme of sequential viola-
tions that may affect individuals to different degrees, poten-
tially leading to class conflicts over issues such as the appro-
priate remedy. For example, in class actions alleging human 
rights violations related to environmental damage, subclassing 
could satisfy the elements of commonality, typicality, and ade-
quacy where some victims have not yet manifested full-blown 
injury.102 Likewise, in cases such as the Holocaust litigation, in 
which the defendant corporation may have targeted different 
groups for different abuses, intraclass conflicts may be resolved 
by dividing the group into subclasses that share like injuries.103 
By finding that a human rights class satisfies the Rule 
23(a) requirements, U.S. federal courts have recognized a de-
fined class that may adjudicate as an entity and may be enti-
tled to relief as well as bound by a final judgment.104 In human 
rights litigation, the group will usually be defined by its com-
mon characteristic of ethnicity, religion, culture, or race, as 
well as by the common harm suffered by that group vis-à-vis 
the injury to members sharing in the common characteristic of 
the group.105 To the extent that these classes seek to enforce 
 
 100. See Doe v. Karadzic, 176 F.R.D. 458, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 101. After Amchem, the required inquiry appears to be stricter. The Supreme 
Court found that discrepancies among asbestos-related injuries would lead to inade-
quate representation where the currently injured and the exposed-only plaintiffs were 
included in one class. See Leading Case, 111 HARV. L. REV. 349, 353 (1997). 
 102. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624-27; see infra notes 244-48 and accompanying 
text. 
 103. See infra Part III.D. 
 104. Class definition also identifies those entitled to notice in a Rule 23(b)(3) ac-
tion. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.14 (3d ed. 1995). 
 105. An example is Jews or Gypsies who claim systematic plundering of assets by 
corporate defendants on account of their ethnic heritage or indigenous tribes claiming 
harm to their culture caused by defendants’ environmental activities. See, e.g., Karad-
zic, 176 F.R.D. at 460 (defining class of Croat and Muslim citizens who allege they are 
victims and/or survivors of victims of campaign of terror led by defendant). The 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, warns against using subjective criteria or criteria 
that depends upon the merits, because “[s]uch definitions frustrate efforts to identify 
class members, [and] contravene the policy against considering the merits of a claim in 
deciding whether to certify a class.” MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.14 (3d ed. 
1995) (citing Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1981)). 
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the rights of a group, the class action is a powerful tool in the 
evolution of collective rights. 
II. CLASS PROCEDURE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. Substantive Consequences of Class Procedure 
This section discusses how the process of judicial certifica-
tion of a human rights class shapes the substantive claims 
brought by plaintiffs.106 The interplay of procedural rules and 
substantive norms in the area of class actions has been ac-
cepted in different contexts but has not been analyzed in the 
context of human rights law.107 
Within the bounds of their rule-making authority, federal 
courts may participate in the process of developing CIL norms 
through the common law. Courts have significant rule-making 
authority in procedural matters, which is generally shared 
with the legislature.108 Among Article III’s proscriptions is the 
 
 106. See Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 
23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 860 (1995) (reasoning that “one need not read very far be-
tween the lines to find a substantive impulse underlying the federal courts’ handling of 
mass tort litigation, and, in particular, class action innovations developed to cope with 
it”). 
 107. The class action has been identified as the procedural cog in substantive tort 
reform efforts. See id. at 870. Large class settlements implement an alternative to the 
tort system that is responsive to the federal courts’ substantive concerns about mass 
torts.  
[T]hey 1) abolish punitive damages; 2) abolish or curtail claims for fear of future 
harm; 3) substantially simplify issues of causation with regard to individual 
claims; 4) adopt categorical compensation formats to even out amounts of compen-
satory payments; 5) provide for further compensation for actual worsening of con-
ditions; and 6) cap or define the tort litigation costs for defendants. 
Id. at 870. “Asbestos litigation has been the prime area in which federal judges have 
used innovation to achieve essentially substantive goals.” Id at 862; see also Jackson v. 
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1332 (5th Cir. 1985) (case filed, but not cer-
tified, as a class action). 
 108. See The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994) (requiring that rules 
of procedure “not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right”); see also Amchem 
Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997). Much has been written about the bal-
ance between judicial authority over “procedure” and legislative power over fashioning 
rights, obligations, and remedies. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as 
Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 951 n.108 (1998) (noting the scholarly 
debate on the proper scope of rulemaking power vested in Supreme Court under the 
REA). Scholars have noted the limits to rule-making, including the fact that rules can-
not increase predictability but only serve to mask the exercise of discretion by deci-
sionmakers. See id. at 948. Moreover, even if rules do confine discretion, such confine-
ment may “serve to prevent just result by the over- or under-inclusiveness of the rules 
themselves, by their inability to forecast the infinite variety of problems that will arise 
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concept that the lawful function of judge-made procedural rules 
is to facilitate deciding cases or controversies.109 Moreover, in-
ternational law assumes that domestic courts may interpret 
substantive norms with a “margin of appreciation,” taking into 
consideration peculiar domestic circumstances, such as the use 
of a class suit, without betraying the essence of the right in 
question.110 As with class treatment of domestic claims, the 
question is where a court’s authority to apply rules of proce-
dure ends and the creation or modification of rights and reme-
dies begins.111 
The substance-procedure line is murky.112 Many purely pro-
 
in their administration.” Id. at 946. 
 109. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 110. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ Preamble refers to the rights it 
guarantees as “common standard[s] of achievement,” which are to be striven towards 
“by progressive measures.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Premable, U.N. 
Doc. A/777 (Dec. 7, 1948). The International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights obliges States to recognize the rights in the Covenant “to the maximum of 
its available resources.” International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GOAR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. 
A/6316 (1966). Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women allows for the use of essentially subjectively determined rules to pro-
tect and promote human rights by “appropriate” means. See The European Convention 
on Human Rights, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; Kinley, supra note 10, at 13-14; see also 
HOWARD C. YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF 
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 13 (1996). 
 111. See Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The Constitutional Limits of 
Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Fed-
eral Rule 23, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 461 (1997). 
 112. See Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling 
Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281. Professors Hart and Wechsler have suggested that substan-
tive, as opposed to procedural, rules of law are those “which characteristically and rea-
sonably affect people’s conduct at the stage of primary private activity.” HENRY HART & 
HERBERT WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 678 (1953). 
However, this definition does not encompass various rules such as statutes of limita-
tions, laws of immunity, elements of damages, and burdens of proof. See John H. Ely, 
The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724 (1974) (proposing that the 
definition of “conduct” includes the “encouragement of actual activity, the fostering and 
protection of certain states of mind—for example, the feeling of release”). Professor Ely 
defined a procedural rule as a rule “designed to make the process of litigation a fair and 
efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes.” Id. The substantive right “is a right 
granted for one or more nonprocedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not hav-
ing to do with the fairness or efficiency of the litigation process.” Id. at 725; cf. Guy 
Wellborn, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Application of State Law in the Fed-
eral Courts, 55 TEX. L. REV. 371, 403 (1977). Over 20 years ago, Professor Hazard ob-
served the synergy between substance and procedure and that “[t]he necessary tech-
nique is one of circumspect consideration of the appropriate role of the judicial 
institution in shaping the substantive consequences of procedures such as those estab-
lished in Rule 23.” Geoffrey B. Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the 
Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 307 (1973). 
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cedural rules have substantive consequences.113 The substan-
tive consequences of class action adjudication in modern U.S. 
litigation are inescapable. Historically, the class action pro-
vided a vehicle for social change, aiding the plight of the op-
pressed.114 The influence of the class action has been most 
prevalent in the areas of racial politics, consumerism, and en-
vironmentalism.115 Concerns about racial discrimination and 
consumer and environmental injuries shared an affinity: vic-
tims asserted that “fundamental clogs in social processes would 
prevent traditional procedural mechanisms involved in indi-
vidual litigation from naturally righting these wrongs.”116 Each 
plaintiff-initiated movement stressed the contrast between in-
dividual powerlessness and group strength, and each member 
of the movement looked to the courts for help in gaining re-
dress, turning to group litigation as a means of achieving that 
redress.117 
Federal courts clearly have the discretion to determine the 
grounds for class treatment, the prerequisites of notice and 
adequate representation, the limitations that should be im-
posed on the right to opt out, and the conditions under which 
settlements should be approved.118 Each procedural inquiry 
must take into account the substantive “interests” of the group 
and, to a certain extent, the court’s determinations regarding 
 
 113. See Ely, supra note 112, at 700. Also, legal nihilists deny the line exists at all. 
For a discussion of legal nihilism, see Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Ni-
hilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984). 
 114. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 1. Professor Yeazell locates the development 
of adjudicative representation in efforts by courts and commentators since at least the 
seventeenth century to assimilate “group litigation” defined as lawsuits on behalf of or 
against numerous persons conceived of as a litigating entity. See id.; see also Bone, Per-
sonal and Impersonal Litigative Forms, supra note 19, at 218. 
 115. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 244-66 (describing the ways these three social 
movements interacted with the doctrines of a new class-action rule.) Professor Bone 
challenges Yeazell’s assertion that judicial concern with particular social groups and a 
persistent tension between “consent-based” and “interest-based” theories of representa-
tion have been at the core of representative suit and class action law throughout the 
modern period. See Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms, supra note 19, at 
218. 
 116. YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 244. 
 117. See id. at 240-43 (suggesting that if a lawsuit could achieve the same econo-
mies of scale as a manufacturer, it could counterbalance the manufacturer’s advan-
tages). The class action has been described as a “mass production remedy” for “mass 
production wrongs.” Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device Upon the 
Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 307, 308 (1973). 
 118. See generally, The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994). Opt-out 
rights are discussed infra, Part V.A.2. 
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advancement of that substantive interest. For example, a find-
ing that common questions of law and fact do not predominate 
would effectively destroy (b)(3) treatment and the collective 
remedies flowing from it. Similarly, requiring individualized 
notice to all class members in (b)(2) actions may effectively 
prevent plaintiffs from proceeding because of cost alone.119 A 
finding that the representative does not meet the requirement 
of adequate representation may also extinguish the substantive 
rights of individuals who are unable to bring claims apart from 
the class. While arguably a procedural device, the class action 
must employ substantive compromises, such as theories relax-
ing the causation requirements found in simple litigation, in 
order to be effectuated.120 Class actions have offered a theoreti-
cal model for solving some of the more intractable problems of 
substantive tort law in mass tort litigation.121 
B. Class Procedure and the Development of CIL 
This section deals with the development of the legal aspects 
of human rights, which is comprised of two basic elements: 1) 
the legal expression, usually in the form of a legislative state-
ment or judicial pronouncement; and 2) the backing of legal 
sanction, or the means by which human rights are enforced.122 
Accordingly, this section examines the evolution of human 
 
 119. Rule 23(b)(2) class actions do not require notice on the face of the rule, see 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2); however, notice may be required by the judge’s discretion. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). 
 120. See Rosenberg, Individual Justice by Collective Means, supra note 19, at 561 
(describing class action as deviation from the private law adjudicatory ideal). 
 121. In mass torts, “there may often be a total lack of proof as to whose product 
affected which class member in the toxic tort case, and thus the most meaningful way 
of addressing the issue of exposure is with respect to the class as a whole.” Shapiro, 
supra note 108, at 930; see also Marcus, supra note 106, at 860, 873-74; Neuborne 
Memorandum, supra note 60, at 19-21 (discussing Swiss bank market share theories); 
David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vi-
sion of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 855-59 (1984) (proposing class action 
treatment as method of solving problems of proving causation). Substantive theories 
employed in class actions to deal with problems of proof are discussed infra Part III.C. 
 122. While the context here is the legal dimensions of human rights, it should be 
noted that human rights also possess non-legal dimensions, expressed in moral or ethi-
cal terms and obligations. Kinley, supra note 10, at 4. Professor Kinley identifies five 
features referred to as the “legal expression and enforcement continuum as it relates to 
human rights: the formulation of human rights[,] the articulation and definition of 
human rights[,] the implementation and application of human rights[,] the protection 
and promotion [of] human rights[, and] the determination of breaches and provision of 
means for obtaining redress.” Id. at 18-19. 
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rights law toward collective rights adjudication, particularly in 
the recent class actions claiming cultural genocide and indige-
nous spoliation. 
Class treatment, as a judicial expression of human rights 
norms, affects the alleged victims’ substantive rights under in-
ternational law by giving clout to claims of collective or group 
rights.123 Judicial recognition of collective private rights under 
CIL, through class certification and implementation of class 
remedies, enables individuals to exercise rights that, due to 
costs, they would not otherwise enjoy. 
Customary international law is expanding to protect previ-
ously unprotected rights.124 The evolutionary and amorphous 
nature of the body of human rights law leaves the federal 
courts wide latitude in influencing norm identification. Non-
traditional economic and property rights, environmental rights, 
as well as cultural and social rights of indigenous peoples are 
involved in the new wave of class actions against corporate en-
tities.125 In these cases, the judiciary’s voice in enunciating col-
lective rights norms through class definitions (as well as fash-
ioning groups remedies) is even more authoritative given that 
the quest to define human rights in general has not resulted in 
a settled understanding of universality of collective human 
rights and leaves much territory to be charted by the court.126 
 
 123. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 19 FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS. 2d. § 4509 
(1996). 
 124. For a discussion of the various rights now protected under CIL, see STEPHENS 
& RATNER, supra note 31, at 79-94. The developing body of human rights law now in-
cludes condemnation of violence against women and recognition of gender violence as 
violation of the laws of war, and willingness to recognize “domestic” violence as viola-
tion of international war. See id. at 88-89; see also Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New 
Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 607 (1984). “The 
rights to self-determination of peoples; the individual right to leave and return to one’s 
country;  [and t]he principle of non-refoulment of refugees may be regarded as CIL 
norms.” SCHACHTER, supra note 4, at 339; see also International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GOAR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 32-38, U.N. 
Doc. A/6316 (due process rights). Several economic and social rights may be accepted as 
general international law, such as the right to basic sustenance and public assistance 
in health, welfare and basic education. ILO practice indicates that trade union rights, 
including freedom of association are widely accepted. Women’s rights to full equality 
and protection against discrimination are also recognized. 
 125. See Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Cus-
tom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUS. Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 82-85 (1992); Tho-
mas M. Franck, Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity and Community in Law and 
Practice, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 359 (1996). 
 126. See generally Jerome J. Shestack, The Jurisprudence of Human Rights, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 69-105 (Thomas 
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The extent to which federal courts should participate in this 
evolution is debatable, but the fact is that they are currently 
participating by adjudicating human rights litigation.127 
“In practice, civil and political rights have almost always 
been given precedence at both international and domestic lev-
els.”128 However, economic, social, and cultural rights have not 
received such recognition.129 In modern international human 
rights law, the concept of collective or group rights continues to 
evolve. The collective rights of society or “peoples” has been de-
scribed as the “third generation” of human rights, based on 
“fraternity” and requiring new forms of international coopera-
tion.130 This generation follows behind “the ‘first generation’ of 
civil and political rights (based on the idea of ‘liberty’ and pro-
viding protection against state violations of the person), and 
the ‘second generation’ of economic and social rights (based on 
‘equality’ and guaranteeing positive access to essential social 
and economic goods, services and opportunities).”131 The argu-
 
Meron ed., 1984); Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights, 
20 HUM. RTS. Q. 201 (1998). The concept of universality of human rights “flows from 
the notion that as a human being one is automatically entitled to respect for one’s dig-
nity” and constitutes the basis upon which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
was established in 1948. Kinley, supra note 10, at 4. Philosophical arguments justify 
that such rights inhere in the natural condition of being human and that they are part 
of a transcendental moral code that is necessary to maintain a base stratum of human 
dignity. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198-99 (1977) (Kantian 
theories); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 198-230 (1980) (natural 
law theories). However, claims to universality have been challenged by cultural relativ-
ists arguing that the potential existence of human rights is culturally dependent and 
expressly contingent on relevant legal order. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth et al., 
Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 595, 625 (1991) (feminist 
critique of universality, arguing that human rights impinge differently on women); 
Adamantia Pollis, Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism, 18 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 316 (1996). The Critical Legal Studies movement claims that a state’s provision for 
legal mechanism by which rights may be asserted is contingent on maintenance of 
whatever form of societal order that state takes. Rights operate as a means by which 
truly radical political or social change is deflected and deflated. See, e.g., Mark Tush-
net, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1990). Finally, others advocate that the 
notion of universality does not mean that human rights are timeless, unchanging, or 
absolute; rather, any list or conception of human rights is historically specific and 
contingent. See DONNELLY, supra note 10, at 1; Diane Otto, Rethinking the “Uni-
versality” of Human Rights Law, 29 COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997). 
 127. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 128. Kinley, supra note 10, at 9. 
 129. See Philip Alston, Economic and Social Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN 
AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 151-54 (Louis Henkin & John L. Hargrove eds., 1994); 
see also STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 78, at 256-57. 
 130. DONNELLY, supra note 10, at 143. 
 131. Id. 
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ment for collective human rights is problematic, in that human 
rights are commonly understood to “derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person.”132 If human rights are based 
solely upon one’s status as a human being, any rights which 
arise from the solidarity of a community would not be human 
rights.133 The notion of collective human rights therefore re-
quires a radical redefinition of human rights.134 
 Currently, efforts to define collective human rights have 
not resulted in any concrete norms. At the international level, 
groups have exercised human rights based upon “international 
and domestic guarantees ascribed to individuals against dis-
crimination on group-distinctive grounds.”135 For instance, the 
League of Nations attempted to incorporate into its system the 
protection of racial and ethnic minorities.136 Early protection of 
minority groups, differing in race, language, or religion, sought 
to secure the right to peacefully coexist alongside the majority, 
while at the same time preserving the minority groups’ distinct 
characteristics.137 
The development of collective rights, however, was hindered 
by the belief that “observance by states of individually based 
norms would solve the historical problems of oppression and 
brutality that many minorities had confronted.”138 Based on 
that belief, the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration on 
 
 132. Id. at 143-44. 
 133. See id. at 144-45. 
 134. Cf. id. at 145, 147. Donnelly argues that collective rights should be “inter-
preted merely as the rights of individuals acting as members of social groups.” Id. For 
example, the right of self-determination of peoples to determine their political status 
and path of development can be seen as a collective expression of the right to political 
participation. See id. Where people’s rights are presented as prerequisites for other 
human rights, however, this concept is dangerous. 
 135. Kinley, supra note 10, at 10. 
 136. The Covenant of the League of Nations required “all new States to bind 
themselves as a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous 
States to accord to all racial or national minorities within their several jurisdictions 
exactly the same treatment and security, both in law and in fact, that is accorded the 
racial or national majority of their people.” Report of the Committee of Three (Japan, 
Spain and UK) instituted by the Council of the League of Nations pursuant to its Reso-
lution of March 7, 1929, LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 73, at 42-64, 87 (1929), 
reprinted in LOUIS SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 213-251 (1973) (describing the incorporation of treaties protecting mi-
norities into the League of Nations Guarantee). 
 137. See generally Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice, 1935 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 64, reprinted in SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 136 
at 213-23. 
 138. STEINER & ALSTON , supra note 78, at 187. 
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Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights139 paid scant attention to minorities as such or, 
subject to the major exception of self-determination clauses, to 
collective rights.140 Since World War II, international decisions 
have been inspired by a different philosophy—the idea of gen-
eral and universal protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms rather than protection only for minorities in certain 
countries.141 The human rights movements did not produce a 
universal instrument dedicated to the problems and rights of 
minority groups until the Declaration on Minorities was 
adopted in 1992 by the General Assembly.142 Today, some spe-
cific group rights are commonly provided for in international 
human rights instruments relating to cultural activities, mi-
nority languages, religious belief, and self-determination.143 
Efforts have recently been directed toward developing addi-
tional and more detailed normative standards, with more effec-
tive and systematic procedures for implementing and enforcing 
minorities’ rights.144 Along with the work of the international 
 
 139. Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: “In those 
States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to 
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of 
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to 
use their own language.” International Comment on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. 
Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 36, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). “Ar-
ticle 27 is a limited provision. . . . [Q]uestions remain regarding . . . whether the right 
to enjoy ‘culture’ extends to land and resource rights, and whether it effectively estab-
lishes rights for human groups as such.” Benedict Kingsbury, Claims by Non-State 
Groups in International Law, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 481, 490 (1992), reprinted in 
PHILIP ALSTON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 498 (1996). 
 140. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 78, at 987. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. For example, Articles 19 through 24 in the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, which covers rights to equality, self-determination, property, develop-
ment, security, and a safe environment, refer to “all peoples” rather than “everyone” or 
“all individuals,” and declares that the rights are exercisable “individually or collec-
tively.” 21 I.L.M. 58, 62-63 (1982) The South African Bill of Rights protects the rights 
to property of a “person or community.” S. AFR. CONST. § 25 (adopted May 8, 1996; 
amended Oct. 11, 1996). 
 144. “A Working Group of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has, 
after many years of slow progress, . . . draft[ed] [a] Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities for consideration 
by the U.N. General Assembly.” Kingsbury, supra note 139, at 493. The General As-
sembly Resolution and Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities passed December 18, 1992. 32 I.L.M. 911 
(1993). The General Assembly adopted the U.N. Declaration as a reaffirmation that a 
basic aim of the U.N. is “to promote and encourage respect for human rights and for 
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community, U.S. federal courts have the unique opportunity to 
participate in the evolution of CIL toward collective rights 
norms. Within the process of judicial expression and resolution 
of class claims, the evolution of collective rights continues. 
C. Collective Rights Adjudication and Norm Enunciation 
The recent wave of class suits both evidences and contrib-
utes to the idea that fundamental human rights may not only 
belong to individual persons but to classes as well.145 Apart 
from recognition through international instruments, judicial 
recognition of classes grants substantive power to groups to de-
fine themselves as rights holders. Human rights claims by non-
state groups are valid when articulated as claims by aggregates 
of individuals who are seeking vindication of the same rights 
enjoyed by other members of the local society.146 Groups, such 
as indigenous tribes allegedly injured by environmental de-
struction or victims of certain nationalities or ethnic heritage, 
such as gypsies or Jews injured by the Nazi Holocaust, collec-
tively exercise participation “rights” as they seek group reme-
dies.147 The judicial decision to define and certify the class of 
human rights victims confers a type of “property” right to such 
groups, in that they can aggregate their claims in order to 
 
fundamental freedoms for all.” Id. at 913; see also G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th  
Sess., Agenda Item 97(b) (1993); Geer, supra note 11, at 355-69. “The Council of Europe 
is considering a European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, and the Euro-
pean Commission for Democracy Through Law (the Venice Commission) in 1991 pro-
posed that the Council of Europe adopt a European Convention for the Protection of 
Minorities, implementation of which would be supervised by a European Committee for 
the Protection of Minorities.” Kingsbury, supra note 139, at 501 (citing Declaration on 
Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States § VII, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 
1292, 1295 (1975)). 
 145. See Hari M. Osofsky, Environmental Human Rights under the Alien Tort 
Statute: Redress for Indigenous Victims of Multinational Corporations, 20 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 335, 337-45 (1997) (arguing that environmental human rights of 
indigenous groups have been sufficiently developed to be used as a basis for suits under 
ATCA). 
 146. “More difficult problems arise with this domain of discourse [of human rights 
law] where the claim of the group is couched as something more than simply an aggre-
gate of individual rights claims, or where the rights sought are not demonstrably iden-
tical with those enjoyed by the ambient population. In these and other situations . . . 
the non-state groups . . . may find their claims are opposed by others on human rights 
grounds.” Kingsbury, supra note 139, at 502. For example, equality rights “may . . . 
provide grounds for upholding or for rejecting a particular group claim.” Id. 
 147. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 1. 
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amass financial power.148 Class status enables dispersed and 
politically unorganized individuals to present their claims as 
an organization, thereby dispensing with the costs of creating 
an organization.149 
Plaintiff classes in the recent wave of human rights class 
litigation have the procedural power to allege and possibly en-
force norms on the outer boundaries of established human 
rights. The term “norms” is used in this context in a “generic 
sense to include a broad class of generalized prescriptive 
statements— principles, standards, rules, and so on—both pro-
cedural and substantive.”150 
1. Cultural genocide and the rights of indigenous peoples 
Cultural genocide is defined as harm which is aimed at a 
group’s cultural characteristics.151 Cultural genocide, or “ethno-
cide,” of indigenous peoples is described as “any action which 
has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as dis-
tinct peoples, or their cultural values of ethnic identities; any 
action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of 
their lands, territories, or resources; any form of population 
transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermin-
ing any of their rights; or any form of assimilation or integra-
tion by other cultures or ways of life” imposed upon them by 
legislative initiative.152 The group is defined by the members’ 
participation in the tribe or indigenous culture.153 In such 
claims, each member’s individual harm is subordinated to the 
group harm suffered by the tribe. Common questions among 
members as to the extent of the group harm fit well within the 
parameters of Rule 23’s prerequisites for commonality and 
typicality, based on the defendant’s common course of con-
duct.154 
 
 148. See id. at 6. 
 149. See id. at 248-49. 
 150. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 113. What brings both general and spe-
cific norms (for example, those codified in a treaty) “into a single generic category is 
that they carry[] a sense of obligation.” Id. 
 151. See, e.g., Doe v. Karadzic, 176 F.R.D. 458, 461-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (plaintiffs 
alleging that defendant engaged in ethnic cleansing to rid the area of non-Serbs). 
 152. Geer, supra note 11, at 360. 
 153. See Karadzic, 176 F.R.D. at 460-61 (defining the class nationally, ethnically, 
religiously, and by fact of rights violations.). 
 154. Common questions of law may be to what extent the defendant’s conduct 
caused destruction of the group through the attack on cultural characteristics of the 
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The concept of ethnocide presumes the existence of collec-
tive rights held by the group—rights to cultural values, ethnic 
identities, lands, and resources. “Ethnocide” does not exist in 
U.N. human rights instruments, although it may be understood 
as being closely associated with genocide which is outlawed by 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide.155 Genocide, the intentional destruction of a 
group,156 is considered a human rights violation in CIL, upon 
which plaintiffs may assert ATCA claims.157 While the prohibi-
tion of genocide is considered a universal norm for which non-
state actors may be liable, cultural genocide is more expansive 
and problematic in the context of corporate liability158 because 
plaintiffs must prove scienter.159 Given the existence of the cor-
porate profit motive and the authorization of the corporate 
conduct by local governments, cultural genocide may be diffi-
cult to prove, but it is not impossible.160 Corporate intent has 
been proven by presumptions in other domestic contexts in fed-
 
class. See id. at 462. 
 155. In Article III of the Draft Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, in the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide,  
the following acts were considered as constituting the crime of ‘cultural’ genocide: 
(1) Prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in 
schools . . . (2) Destroying, or preventing the use of, libraries, museums, schools, 
historical monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects 
of the group. 
SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 136, at 330-31 (quoting Report of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Genocide, U.N. ESCOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 6, at 6, U.N. Doc. E/794 (1948)). 
During the debate of this article, “it was maintained that such acts would result in 
losses to humanity in the form of ‘cultural contributions’, for which it was indebted to 
the destroyed group.” SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 136, at 330-31. 
 156. Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, entered into force January 12, 1951, provides: “genocide means any of the 
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group, as such: a) Killing members of the group; b) Causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) Deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.” 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 2, 1951, 
78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280. 
 157. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238-40 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 158. The court in Beanal looked to the Genocide Convention, Article 2(c) to deter-
mine if “cultural genocide” would raise the level of CIL and found that CIL did not in-
clude genocide of a culture but only the destruction of a group. See Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 372-73 (E.D. La. 1997). 
 159. Interpretation of genocide involves analysis of intent. See Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 2, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; see 
also Beanal 969 F. Supp. at 373. 
 160. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 896 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
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eral court jurisprudence.161 Borrowing from such precedent, 
courts could fashion a body of law under which plaintiffs may 
state a cause of action for cultural genocide against private 
corporate defendants.162 
The notion of “cultural rights” is closely tied with collective 
rights of peoples. “Cultural rights refer to a community’s ‘way 
of life,’ but not those aspects of the way of life regulated by 
other classes of human rights.”163 In a sense, “cultural rights” 
are a residual, but essential, category because “a community’s 
distinctive way of life typically possesses an important value, 
at least for its members, and we do see participation in ‘culture’ 
as essential to a life of dignity.”164 
“Cultural land rights” of indigenous peoples also encompass 
collective ownership between tribal peoples and the living eco-
system of their habitat and are the “primary basis of cultural 
identification.”165 The international community recognizes that 
indigenous and tribal peoples have the right to exercise control 
over their destiny and provide the process of development, as it 
affects their lives, beliefs, institutions, spiritual well-being, and 
the lands they occupy or otherwise use.166 
The recognition of group rights in international law stems 
from the notion that some human rights, such as the right to 
self-determination, can only be exercised collectively.167 The 
 
 161. Scienter has been proven by inferring intent based on evidence that a corpo-
ration aided and abetted a primary wrongdoer. It requires showing the existence of “(1) 
an independent wrongful act; (2) knowledge by the aider and abettor [corporation] of 
the wrongful act; and (3) substantial assistance [by the corporation] in effecting that 
wrongful act.” ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 8.10.3, n.20 (1986) (citing Rolf v. 
Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that recklessness sat-
isfies the scienter requirement under 10(b)(5)). 
 162. The Beanal case is currently pending appeal in the Fifth Circuit. 
 163. DONNELLY, supra note 10, at 155. 
 164. Id.; see also SOHN & BUERGENTHAL, supra note 136, at 330 (describing the 
development of notion of culture: “[w]hereas race is strictly a question of heredity, cul-
ture is essentially one of tradition in the broadest sense”). 
 165. Geer, supra note 11, at 349-50. 
 166. See Lee Swepston, The ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 
169): Eight Years After Adoption, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 24-25 
(Cynthia P. Cohen ed., 1998); see also Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) (signed June 13, 1992) (clarifying that rights exist whenever 
lands have been traditionally occupied and setting forth, in articles 7 and 14, that 
rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they 
traditionally occupy shall be recognized); Stockholm Declaration on the Human Envi-
ronment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14/Rev. 1 (U.N. Pub. E.73, II.A.14) (1973). 
 167. If a right is to be claimed—that of preserving one’s language and culture—it 
will have to be attributed to the community. See Charles Taylor, Human Rights: The 
BOYD-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:18 AM 
1139] COLLECTIVE RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 1177 
class structure provides the mechanism to enforce such rights 
collectively and may be the only mechanism by which group 
rights may be enforced.168 
Plaintiff classes in recent cases have included indigenous 
groups who have been injured by mining and oil exploration.169 
In Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, for example, the plaintiff, a 
leader of an Indonesian tribe, brought suit on behalf of his tribe 
against a subsidiary of Freeport, a U.S. corporation that oper-
ates copper, gold, and silver mines in Irian Jaya, Indonesia.170 
The complaint alleged violations of international environ-
mental law171 and, in particular, claimed that Freeport’s abu-
sive environmental practices resulted in the “demise of the cul-
ture of the indigenous tribal people,” in other words, “cultural 
genocide.”172 Though cultural genocide has not traditionally 
been recognized as a human rights violation under CIL, the 
Beanal court did not dispute that evidence of environmental 
harm could be used to establish cultural genocide.173 
 
Legal Culture in UNESCO, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 49 
(1986), reprinted in STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 78, at 173-76 (1996) (describing 
Romanticism’s influence on the view of man as a “cultural being who develops his hu-
manity through a language” and knowledge that is expressed in a culture); Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, art. 1, 49 U.N. Doc A/6316 
(1967) (“All peoples have the right to self-determination.”). 
 168. See Rymn J. Parsons, The Fight to Save the Planet: U.S. Armed Forces, 
“Greenkeeping,” and Enforcement of the Law Pertaining to Environmental Protection 
During Armed Conflict, 454 GEO. INT’L ENVT’L. L. REV. 441, 453-54 (1998) (contrasting 
civil remedies with the adjudicatory responsibilities of international tribunals). 
 169. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (oil exploration); 
Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997); Aguinda v. Tex-
aco, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), vacated sub nom., Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 
F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 170. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 362 (district court dismissed complaint under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) after agreeing that the ATCA creates a cause 
of action for violations of international law). Beanal was not considered a class claim 
because plaintiff failed to file for certification within the 90-day requisite time period. 
See id. at 367. The court in dicta indicated that Beanal had alleged insufficient facts to 
meet the adequacy of representation requirement. See id. at 368. 
 171. The complaint alleged, “[T]he mine itself has hollowed several mountains, re-
routed rivers, stripped forest and increased toxic and non-toxic materials and metals in 
the river system.” Id. at 382. In addition, the plaintiffs asserted claims for violations of 
accepted human rights norms, including violations by security personnel at Freeport’s 
mines. See id. at 368-69. The plaintiffs asserted additional human rights claims based 
upon the environmental damages caused by the defendants. See id. at 382-84. Non-
genocide human rights violations required state action, and Beanal failed to allege 
state action. See id. at 371. 
 172. Id. at 372. 
 173. In dicta, the court criticizes the plaintiffs for not connecting their facts with 
elements of the offense. See id. at 373. The plaintiffs in Aguinda, 850 F. Supp. at 282, 
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The international community is increasingly recognizing 
the special status of indigenous peoples in international law.174 
The second section of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples affirms the right of indigenous peoples to 
life and existence and, in particular, condemns policies of eth-
nocide.175 However, there are as yet no generally accepted defi-
nitions of “indigenous peoples” or even “minority” in the inter-
national community.176 Indigenous populations have been 
disproportionately oppressed and victimized; their “habitats, 
both culturally and geographically, have tended to be far re-
 
and Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 880, did not allege violations of international human 
rights norms related to indigenous groups or other collective rights probably due to the 
lack of precedent in ATCA litigation for claims of cultural genocide or violations of 
group rights. See Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 372. However, the facts indicate that such 
claims could have been pled. 
 174. Indigenous peoples number over 300,000,000—roughly five percent of the 
world’s total population. See Geer, supra note 11, at 346. For an overview of the U.N.’s 
work in the area of indigenous peoples, see Jose P. Kastrup, The Internationalization of 
Indigenous Rights from the Environmental and Human Rights Perspective, 32 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 97, 103 (1997); see also JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 48-49 (1991); Russell L. Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: 
From Object to Subject of International Law?, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33 (1994) (discuss-
ing developments in international law recognition of indigenous peoples’ identity); 
Markus Schmidt, Book Review, Coming to Grips with Indigenous Rights, 10 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 341 (1997). 
 175. The U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Article 27 
provides that Indigenous peoples have the right to restitution of the lands, territories 
and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and 
which have been confiscated, occupied, used, or damaged without their free and in-
formed consent. See U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, Annex 1. 
 176. Geer, supra note 11, at 346 n.50 (citing Preliminary Report on the Study of 
Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 26th 
Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 10, at 19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.566 (1972)). Pro-
fessor Geer adopts a working definition developed by a U.N. study on indigenous popu-
lations: 
Indigenous community, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their ter-
ritories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now pre-
vailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present nondominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future 
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of 
their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural pat-
terns, social institutions and legal systems. 
Id. at 346-47 (citing Jose R. Martiniz Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination 
Against Indigenous Populations, at 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, U.N. 
Sales No. E.86.XIV.3 (1987)). 
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moved from the ‘corridors of power.’ ”177 Therefore, where 
classes of indigenous peoples are defined as a litigative entity, 
power is granted to groups where little or none has existed.178 
By allowing a tribe or other group bound by common ethnic and 
cultural characteristics to enforce these cultural rights to group 
existence, U.S. courts effectively expand international concepts 
of collective rights violations. 
2. The Holocaust cases and collective economic rights 
Class action claims of other group rights, such as economic 
and property rights brought by the plaintiffs representing vic-
tims of the Holocaust, also allow for the expansion of substan-
tive human rights. In claims brought by survivors of the Holo-
caust, Swiss banks were accused of collaborating with the Nazi 
government in looting and plundering property of the Jewish 
victims, accepting the laundered assets, concealing profits 
made from dormant accounts deposited by the victims, and 
knowingly financing the Holocaust through loans to the Nazi 
government.179 
While economic rights have not traditionally been recog-
nized as fundamental human rights,180 indigenous spoliation 
may provide an actionable claim when brought in a class action 
because the exercise of universally accepted fundamental hu-
man rights of individuals depends upon the continued exis-
tence of the group that is threatened by indigenous spolia-
tion.181 Indigenous spoliation is defined as the destruction of a 
 
 177. Christian Bay, Human Rights on the Periphery: No Room in the Ark for the 
Yanomani?, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 124, 127 (Richard P. Claude 
& Burns H. Weston eds., 1992) (explaining that wide-scale ramifications of destruction 
of an indigenous people puts every individual’s survival at stake when ethnocide is in 
progress by way of destroying the natural habitat or the religious faith or the needed 
privacy of an indigenous people for the purpose of “development”). 
 178. See Geer, supra note 11, at 335-41. 
 179. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text. 
 180. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. 
 181. However, alleging that “commercial” conduct rises to the level of a violation of 
CIL for the purposes of ATCA is a difficult position. Plaintiffs pointed to the trial of two 
bankers and industrialists for “commercial conduct” that aided the Nazis in committing 
genocide and concealing profits. See Anita Ramasastry, Secrets and Lies? Swiss Banks 
and International Human Rights, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 325, 413-14 (1998). The 
only private banker tried under the Nuremberg Charter, Karl Rasche, Chairman of 
Dresdner Bank, was tried and convicted at Nuremberg for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. See id. at 414-17; see also The Ministries Case, in XIV TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS 621-22 (Rasche and Emil Puhl were tried jointly with 19 other defen-
dants). The defendants in the Swiss bank cases argued that the sale of money or credit 
BOYD-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:18 AM 
1180 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
state’s endowment, the laying waste of the wealth and re-
sources belonging by right to its citizens, or the denial of their 
group heritage.182 
Judicial recognition of class status for groups of Holocaust 
survivors’ and families’ claims reinforces the concept that 
groups possess certain collective economic interests, without 
which the group’s right to exist is threatened. Jewish and 
Gypsy victims seek relief for the demise of their heritage 
caused by the defendant’s commercial conduct. In turn, their 
common ethnicity provides the basis of procedural require-
ments because the representative plaintiff partakes in the 
common characteristic of the group, which provides class status 
and may provide the power to claim such collective harm.183 
While merely alleging group harm does not automatically make 
such harm a violation of CIL, without the class structure the 
claims of systemic harm could not be brought at all.184 Indeed, 
class claims of collective economic rights may allow for a more 
accurate assessment of systemic harm done to the group and 
actually provide remedies that better address the class-wide-
injury.185 
In sum, since the harm under the ATCA must be stated as 
 
did not violate CIL, even where the financial institution knew that the recipient of 
these services was utilizing the services as part of an ongoing war crime or crime 
against humanity. See Defendants’ Reply Memo in Support of Defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss the International Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim at 26, In re Holo-
caust Victim Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. July 9, 1997). The banks also argued 
that the CIL norms in place in the 1930s or 1940s were not violated. It should be noted 
that “[n]o one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the 
time when it was committed.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 11(2) U.N. 
Doc. A/777 (1948); Walter J. Rockler, Prosecuting Bloodless War Crimes, 18 LITIG. VOL. 
2, at 18-21, 59-60 (1992). 
 182. See NDIVA KOFELE-KALE, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
ECONOMIC CRIMES 111-63 (1995) (characterizing indigenous spoliation as a breach of 
international customary law of fiduciary relations); Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Patrimonicide: 
The International Economic Crime of Indigenous Spoliation, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
45, 56-61 (1995). 
 183. See Julia Collins, Stuart Eizenstat: Taking on the Unfinished Business of the 
Twentieth Century, HARV. L. BULL., Summer 1999, at 18 (“The restoration of commu-
nal property is providing infrastructure for the reawakening of Jewish and Catholic 
communities.”). 
 184. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. 969 F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. La. 1997) 
(holding that without class certification, the named plaintiff had no standing to sue on 
behalf of the group and also dismissing the claim of cultural genocide). 
 185. See Rosenberg, Individual Justice by Collective Means, supra note 19, at 587-
89. 
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a violation of CIL, courts have the unique opportunity to not 
only “find” that the human rights norms evidenced by state 
practice and opinio juris exist in a given case, but, in defining 
the rights holders, also participate in the development of the 
international society’s consciousness regarding group rights. 
Thus, courts create opinio juris, the psychological component of 
international law.186 When this component is added to the 
evolving practice of states, the combination of psychological 
and material elements arguably constitutes binding CIL. 
As federal courts draw from CIL sources to define the valid-
ity of the class, one may question whether the collective rights 
being defined and adjudicated are “new” human rights or sim-
ply rights that grow out of traditional human rights norms. In 
any event, the dynamic nature of CIL allows domestic court 
procedure, through the certification of class actions, to become 
part of the transnational public law discourse through which 
international human rights norms are developed. When domes-
tic courts are willing to give litigative status to collective claims 
of human rights, “utility, stasis, internalization, social pres-
sure, moral compulsion, and fear of punishment,” the courts 
may then contribute to the creation of new norms that carry a 
sense of legal obligation.187 The interpretation, elaboration, ap-
plication, and, ultimately, enforcement of international rules is 
accomplished through a process of (mostly verbal) interchange 
among interested parties. The federal courts participate in that 
process. The judicial interpretation of substantive human 
rights of groups through the process of class definition is, 
therefore, one aspect of the legal dimension of the developing 
human rights law.188 Also present in class adjudication is the 
granting of a class remedy to enforce such rights, thus giving 
substantive teeth to the legal norm. 
Class adjudication of human rights claims, both by recogni-
tion of the class status of claims holders and by the granting of 
 
 186. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 60 (1980) (arguing for the 
“presentation” of norms). 
 187. “In contrast to other norms, legal norms have a relatively high degree of for-
mality [and are] often authoritatively stated in formal instruments.” CHAYES & 
CHAYES, supra note 5, at 114. “The production of legal norms is linked to the apparatus 
of governments, and compliance often involves public coercive action,” and almost all 
legal norms carry an obligation of obedience. Id. at 116; see FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, 
RULES, NORMS, AND DECISION: ON THE CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL 
REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 123-24 (1989). 
 188. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 118-23. 
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relief to the group, expands the categories of international 
norms being developed in U.S. courts.189 The next part will ex-
plore the class remedies available to persons whose human 
rights are violated by corporate conduct. 
III. COLLECTIVE REMEDIES FOR COLLECTIVE RIGHTS 
A. The Role of Remedy 
The legal status of human rights groups represented by a 
plaintiff class depends upon the legal sanction granted to the 
class.190 Enforcement of human rights has been the obsession of 
proponents in the twentieth century; some have questioned the 
existence of the rights altogether when there are no measures 
for enforcing them.191 Indeed, it is well accepted in rights the-
ory that where there is no remedy for a claim of right, the exis-
tence of the correlative right is tenuous at best.192 The imposi-
tion of obligations within a legal framework therefore gives 
rights practical authority and places interests on a higher 
plane of legal prescription.193 In a class action human rights 
case, once it is determined that international law binds the pri-
vate corporate actor to respect human rights, then the granting 
of a remedy solidifies the corporation’s legal duty. Accordingly, 
when a group remedy is enforced through the class action suit, 
the group’s collective rights are grounded in a legal norm.194 
Particularly where collective rights are being adjudicated, 
viewing the remedy procedurally as a remedy for the group 
seems more appropriate than viewing the remedy as address-
ing individual claims in the aggregate.195 Treating the class as 
 
 189. See, e.g, Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 362. In its analysis of the motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim, the court wrestled with the question of whether an identifi-
able human right to a clean environment exists as CIL. See id. at 383-84. 
 190. See Kinley, supra note 10, at 3. 
 191. See generally Rutti Teitel, Human Rights Genealogy, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
301, 305-06 (1997). 
 192. See Kinley, supra note 10, at 15; see e.g., WESLEY N. HOHFELD, 
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 35-40, 56-60 (1964) (distinguishing between “true” 
rights (which are rights as “claims”) and “privileges” (which are rights as interests or 
goods or even demands, which may operate at level of persuasion in policy debates)). 
 193. See Kinley, supra note 10, at 8. 
 194. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 115-18 (defining legal norm). 
 195. The “entity model” views the entity as the litigant and the client and treats 
the class action not as an aggregation of individuals but rather as an entity in itself for 
the purposes of determining the nature of the lawsuit. See Shapiro, supra note 108, at 
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an entity “does not deny the class member the opportunity to 
seek private advice or to contribute in some way to progress,” 
but it severely limits some aspects of individual autonomy, in-
cluding the choice to move in or out of the class or be repre-
sented before the court by counsel of one’s own choice.196 This 
“entity model” fits the human rights case in which the litigant 
is a cohesive group possessing collective rights.197 
B. Rule 23 Remedial Creativity 
1. Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) remedies 
Rule 23 allows a wide range of creativity for collective 
remedies for entities.198 Mandatory class actions under 23(b)(1) 
and (b)(2) best adhere to the entity model where the class as a 
whole is the litigant. Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) actions are effec-
tive in assuring class recovery when plaintiffs are not ade-
quately distinguishable from the class because the plaintiffs 
and procedural posture of the claims are too similar to allow 
opt out.199 
Compensation through a mandatory (b)(1)(B) class is avail-
able where the class demonstrates that the fund available from 
the defendant is insufficient to satisfy the aggregate of all 
claims.200 The process of allocating compensation from a “lim-
 
918-19. In contrast, the aggregation model “sees the various joinder devices . . . as es-
sentially techniques for allowing individuals to achieve the benefits of pooling re-
sources against a common adversary . . . and the individual surrenders as little auton-
omy as possible.” Id. at 918. For example, the individual “retains his own counsel, 
retains the right to leave the group before, during, and after the litigation, and can in-
sist on playing a significant role in operations of the group” if he decides to remain. Id. 
 196. See id. at 919. 
 197. Croat Muslims, an indigenous tribe, or Jewish victims of the Holocaust are 
examples of cohesive groups possessing collective rights. Given the opportunity, the 
members of the group of human rights victims would usually choose to be treated as an 
entity, with its consequent averaging devices such as class action adjudication, either 
by settlement or through an opt-in procedure for class trial. See Rosenberg, Individual 
Justice and Collectivizing, supra note 19, at 214-16 (pointing out that the concept of 
individual justice embraces a rational-choice notion of self-determination, wherein an 
individual confronting uncertainty prefers the process option that maximizes expected 
personal utility from tort liability). 
 198. See generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 7B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1784, at 78-79, 86-88 (2d ed. 1985) (arguing that federal courts have 
broad equitable power to devise novel remedial approaches in class actions). 
 199. See, e.g., Doe v. Karadzic, 182 F.R.D. 424, 426 (holding class certified under 
Rule 23(d)(5) grant of narrow discretionary power). 
 200. See id. 182 at 426-27. 
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ited fund” must address any conflicting interests between 
members and assure that the claimants identified by a common 
theory of recovery are treated equitably among themselves.201 
Where such cohesion exists, subordinating individual rights to 
participate or opt out are justified.202 For example, in Doe v. 
Karadzic, the court denied individual plaintiffs the right to opt 
out of the (b)(1)(B) mandatory class on the ground that the po-
tential withdrawal would jeopardize potential class recovery.203 
Rule 23(b)(2) suits are most suitable for the enforcement of 
public laws, including human rights law.204 When the alleged 
human rights violations are widespread, the class action device 
provides an effective remedy. The court will have the power to 
monitor obviation of illegal conduct “in contrast to a mere dec-
laration of abstract rights for an individual case, which is only 
binding as to the specific plaintiff and has, at best, a limited 
stare decisis effect.”205  
Rule 23(b)(2)—indicating that it is “appropriate” to grant 
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with 
respect to the class as a whole where the party opposing the 
class has acted on grounds generally applicable to the class—
underscores the idea that the legal system aspires to treat all 
similarly situated persons alike.206 If an actor has treated a 
group of persons unlawfully, it is appropriate that, if required 
 
 201. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2316-19 (1999); In re Asbestos 
Litigation, 90 F.3d 963, 973-74 (5th Cir. 1996). Fibreboard was remanded by the Su-
preme Court in light of Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). See Fi-
breboard, 119 S. Ct. at 2295. 
 202. See infra Part V.A.2 for a discussion of opt out rights. 
 203. See Karadzic, 182 F.R.D at 424-28 (denying motion for interlocutory appeal 
on issue of motion to opt out and stating that there is no due process right to opt out of 
(b)(1)(B) class). The court also rejected the moving plaintiffs’ due process arguments. 
See id. 
 204. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 249. 
 205. 5 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 25.25 (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter Newberg]. 
 206. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 257; see also Doe I v. Unocal, No. CV 96-6959, 
1999 WL 819698 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (denying class certification on the ground that plain-
tiffs had no Article III standing). In Unocal, the plaintiffs sought class-wide relief in 
the form of a Rule 23(b)(2) injunction ordering the corporate defendants to cease pay-
ments to the military government and to cease their participation in the joint enter-
prise until the resulting human rights violations ceased. See id. at *6. The plaintiffs 
also sought an injunction “preclud[ing] Unocal from selling its shares to a corporation 
which [would] not waive any objections to th[e] court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction 
or prohibit the transfer of Unocal’s interest to any entity which [would] not agree to be 
bound by the terms of the Court’s injunction.” Id. The plaintiffs also suggested “that 
Unocal might be ordered to disgorge its profits from the pipeline.” Id.  
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to mend his ways, he must mend them as to all.207 Where cor-
porate defendants have caused harm to a group of similarly 
situated persons—similar because of their common ethnicity or 
minority status, location at the time of the abuses, or type of 
harm suffered—then class injunctive relief is appropriate. In 
considering (b)(2) certification of the human rights class action 
against Unocal, the court found that the group of residents 
from the Tenasserim region of Burma which made up the puni-
tive class were so similarly situated because they sufficiently 
showed that they were suffering the adverse effects of the al-
leged human rights abuses.208 The court also found that the 
plaintiffs could be subject to a “credible threat” of future injury 
due to the alleged ongoing human rights abuses caused by the 
corporation.209 Particularly where the corporate defendant pos-
sesses the means to remedy the harm as to all the members, for 
example, by environmental clean-up, the (b)(2) class structure 
is well suited.210 
The representatives of the proposed class must demonstrate 
standing to seek the requested injunctive relief even prior to 
the determination of Rule 23’s requirements.211 The district 
court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument in Unocal that they 
automatically had standing to seek injunctive relief because 
they had standing to pursue claims for damages.212 The class 
representatives must demonstrate that a causal link exists be-
tween the group’s injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the 
defendant.213 Moreover, the scope of the injunctive relief must 
redress the group harm; where class-wide relief requires addi-
tional parties not within the court’s jurisdiction in order to re-
dress the harm caused by the human rights violations, injunc-
 
 207. YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 257; see also Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra 
note 19, at 569 n.20 (stating that a (b)(2) class action may be used for structural relief, 
such as a school or institutional reform suit). But see Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflict 
in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1188-91 (1982) (stating that although liability 
issues may be common to the class in structural relief cases, there can be serious class 
conflict at the remedy stage). 
 208. See Unocal, No. CV 96-6959, 1999 WL 819698, at *4-*5. 
 209. Id. at *4. 
 210. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 282, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 211. See Unocal, No. CV 96-6959, 1999 WL 819698, at *2. But see Ortiz v. Fibre-
board Corp., 119 S.Ct. 2295, 2307 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591, 612 (1997) (holding it is appropriate to reach Rule 23 requirements first if they are 
logically antecedent to Article III concerns). 
 212. See Unocal, No. CV 96-6959, 1999 WL 819698, at *5. 
 213. See id. at *2. 
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tive relief may not be appropriate.214 The (b)(2) class requires a 
strongly homogenous unit, since the remedy is a single, unitary 
injunction that directly benefits the class.215 
Where plaintiffs seek recovery under CIL, the (b)(2) class 
provides a procedural means for such a goal. For human rights 
victims seeking relief as a group, finding a single “voice” is, at 
times, more important than any monetary compensation.216 
Few fora offer an institutionalized pronouncement of legal 
norms as does the (b)(2) class remedy. Moreover, where the de-
terrence of harm by corporate defendants and corrective justice 
for the victims provides greater benefit than the preservation of 
individual rights to participate, which likely will not be exer-
cised on a practical level, there is a strong case for collectiviza-
tion of human rights claims.217 Particularly where the right to 
individualized adjudication will not exist practically for vic-
tims, given the choice, the reasonable human rights plaintiff 
would choose the aggregate claim treatment.218 
2. Rule 23(b)(3) class remedies 
Subsection (b)(3) classes provide for monetary relief and re-
quire heightened scrutiny of whether intraclass conflicts exits 
between members’ interests.219 Homogeneity between interests 
in the (b)(3) class is more difficult to achieve at the damage cal-
culation stage; however, many innovative collective remedies, 
such as fluid recovery, sampling, and averaging of damage 
awards, have been applied to (b)(3) classes to, in effect, struc-
ture a group remedy to fit the group right being enforced. 
Rule 23(b)(3) provides for class certification when the dam-
ages sought are primarily monetary and common questions of 
law or fact predominate, as in the Holocaust survivors’ suits for 
disgorgement of profits and compensation for slave labor.220 
Where there are many victims seeking monetary compensation 
 
 214. See id. at *7 (finding that if an injunction were issued to enjoin Unocal, other 
companies not parties to the suit would resume Unocal’s enjoined activities). 
 215. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 19, at 569 n.20. 
 216. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text. 
 217. See infra Part V.B.2. for discussion on deterrence. 
 218. Cf. Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing, supra note 19, at 252-
53. 
 219. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (stating that the 
predominance factor requires more than shared experience). 
 220. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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for human rights abuses in the past, such as in indigenous spo-
liation claims, a (b)(3) class may be the best procedural posture 
for the class members.221 
Again, as in (b)(2) classes, the calculation of damages be-
comes procedurally less difficult when the (b)(3) class is viewed 
as an entity seeking a group remedy rather than individual re-
lief. Where there are discrepancies between injuries to the in-
dividual members, the class structure provides sampling and 
averaging. Courts are authorized to use creative methods for 
calculating damages for the group when individualized consid-
eration is impractical.222 
Fluid recovery is one form of collective monetary relief that 
may be used in human rights class actions. Fluid recovery dis-
tributes damages in class actions involving small individual 
claims, where the small amounts at stake make it administra-
tively impractical to distribute damages on an individual ba-
sis.223 Fluid recovery simplifies the class action by aggregating 
damages suffered by a class in suits where “the [injured] indi-
viduals are unlikely to prove their claims individually or can-
not be given notice.”224 Also, where there may be a surplus of 
 
 221. Rule 23(b)(3) classes are usually used where there has been a “mass tort in 
which there are a large number of victims, all of whom have suffered, or are threatened 
with, substantial injury as a result of the defendant’s conduct and who would be likely 
(if the class action format did not exist) to bring individual actions seeking redress.” 
Shapiro, supra note 108, at 926-27. 
 222. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.47 (3d ed. 1995) (stating that the 
creations of funds and schedules of compensation are determined by aggregate proce-
dures); see, e.g., Lindsey v. Dow Corning Corp., 174 F.3d 203 (11th Cir. 1999) (disease 
compensation program that provides compensation according to a specified schedule 
operated by a Claims Administrator who may in turn hire claims officers); In re Sili-
cone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., CV92-P-10000-S, CV-94-P-1158-S, MDL 
No. 926, 1994 WL 578353 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (holding class certified as a 23(b)(3) 
class); Breast Implant Settlement Agreement §§ III.C, VI.A, In re Silicone Gel Breast 
Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., CV92-P-10000-S, CV94-P-1158-S, MDL No. 926 (N.D. Ala. 
Sept. 1, 1994). 
 223. See generally 2 NEWBERG, supra note 205, §§ 10.16-10.19; WRIGHT ET AL., su-
pra note 198, § 1784, at 82-85 (discussing fluid recovery); Stephen Berry, Ending Sub-
stance’s Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the 
Class Damage Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 299, 299-302 (1980) (noting that small-claimant 
class actions serve deterrence rather than compensation goals). 
 224. Tuneen E. Chisolm, Comment, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door: Examin-
ing the Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 
721 n.265 (1999). The Supreme Court has not passed on the fluid recovery issue. See 
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 n.10 (1974). Congress on the other 
hand has appeared to be sympathetic to fluid recovery in certain situations. See The 
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 15c-15d (providing 
that state attorneys general may sue for “aggregate damages” sustained by citizens of 
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money recovered, fluid recovery concepts would allow for the 
creation of a fund earmarked to further agreed-upon goals of 
the human rights litigation.225 Fluid recovery is consistent with 
the objectives of human rights litigation—deterrence of corpo-
rate abuse,226 disgorgement of profits,227 and compensation.228 
Sampling is another innovative method for apportioning 
damages to human rights groups. Sampling applies statistical 
distribution to a large population of similarly situated cases.229 
The members of the class receive average outcomes, yet their 
allegations raise issues that vary among group members.230 In 
a sense, sampling bears some resemblance to the mandatory 
class action under Rule 23(b)(1), in that both respond to a ne-
cessity for aggregate treatment. Rule 23(b)(1), however, seeks 
to avoid the unfairness associated with certain types of reme-
dial externalities, whereas sampling is designed to achieve ju-
dicial economy gains and facilitate lawsuits by reducing trans-
action and delay costs. 231 The use of a “special master” provides 
another creative means for dealing with a group’s large damage 
awards.232 
 
their states based on “reasonable system of estimating aggregate damages”). 
 225. See CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 384 (West 1999) (providing that “unpaid residuals in 
class action litigation are to be distributed, to the extent possible, . . . in a manner de-
signed either to further the purposes of the underlying causes of action, or . . . to pro-
mote justice for all Californians”). 
 226. See infra, Part V.B.2. 
 227. See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., No. 98-CV-959, 1999 WL 719888 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 14, 1999); Complaint, Pollack v. Seimens AG, No. 98-CV-5499 (E.D.N.Y. filed 
Aug. 30, 1999); Complaint, Hirsch v. Fried. Krupp. AG, No. 98-CV-4280 (D.N.J. filed 
Sept. 11, 1998); Complaint, Gross v. Volkswagen, No. 98-CV-4104 (D.N.J. filed Aug. 31, 
1998); Class Action Complaint, Burger-Fischer v. Deguss AG, No. 98-CV-3958 DRD 
(D.N.J. filed Aug. 21, 1998); Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 60, at 3, 11-12. 
 228. See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 676 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that the accept-
ability of fluid recovery must be determined on a case-by-case basis while holding that 
it could not be applied on these facts). 
 229. See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998) (up-
holding the use of sampling to determine damages). 
 230. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 19, at 564, 605 (squaring sam-
pling with rights-based theory). 
 231. Sampling was effectively used in the Marcos human rights litigation.  See 
generally Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.2d 767, 782-84 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 232. A special master has also been appointed in the Swiss Bank Settlement to 
manage distribution of damages. See Swiss Bank Settlement, In re Holocaust Victims 
Assets, No. CV 96-4849 (E.D.N.Y., Settlement Jan. 26, 1999); Letter from Cohen, Mil-
stein, Hausfeld & Toll, supra note 60 (Judah Gribetz has been appointed special mas-
ter by the court in order to work out the fairest plan of allocation of settlement funds); 
Marilyn Henry, Swiss Banks to Notify Potential Recipients, JERUSALEM POST, May 27, 
1999, at 5. Judah Gribetz has scheduled a “fairness hearing” for November 29, 1999, at 
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While sampling and fluid recovery may have a skewed ef-
fect on damages because they imperfectly allocate the total 
damage figure by distributing damages based upon averages, 
these creative remedies realize effective deterrence goals.233 
Sampling complements collective human rights claims234 and, 
by treating substance and procedure as a single mechanism, 
enforces the human rights that CIL is meant to advance.235 
Sampling does not violate anyone’s rights if the outcomes it 
produces are consistent with the moral theory that supports 
the substantive law, such as corrective justice theories of tort 
law, because it focuses on restoring the moral equilibrium that 
existed between the corporate wrongdoer and the human rights 
victim before the wrong occurred.236 
C. Class Action Solutions for Problems of Proof 
Problems of proof often prevent plaintiffs in international 
human rights cases from obtaining relief. The class action 
model provides solutions for problems of proof that may arise 
in mass human rights cases.237 For example, without the class 
action device, corporate activity designed to conceal evidence 
may prevent adequate discovery for the framing of issues.238 
 
which any survivors may comment on allocation of funds. Public forums will also be 
held in Israel, the United States, Europe, South America, and Australia to solicit com-
ments. See Marilyn Henry, Swiss Banks Reparations Only Expected in One Year, 
JERUSALEM POST, June 6, 1999, at 3. 
 233. See Bower v. Bunker Hill Co., 114 F.R.D. 587, 596 (E.D. Wash. 1986) (recog-
nizing the potential benefits of the aggregate damages approach); see also Bone, Statis-
tical Adjudication, supra note 19, at 572 (noting that the use of sampling can provide 
small-claimant class actions with deterrent effect). But see In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer 
Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995) (reasoning that such deterrence measures 
may be too effective, forcing parties who may not be guilty to settle). 
 234. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 786 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting the 
advantages that sampling provides to plaintiffs and holding that sampling does not 
violate due process). 
 235. See Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 19, at 605 (arguing that under 
moral rights theory sampling does not interfere with litigants’ rights). 
 236. See id; infra Part V.B.1 (discussing corrective justice). 
 237. See Rosenberg, supra note 121, at 855-59, 890 (1984) (proposing class action 
treatment as a method of solving problems of proving causation). 
 238. The Holocaust plaintiffs had difficulty framing claims against Swiss banks 
who they claimed retained their family’s money for over 50 years, given the lack of 
documentary evidence, the time-gap between the claims and events, and the actions of 
the defendants in concealing assets over the years. See Ramasastry, supra note 181, at 
350-51. Holocaust plaintiffs espoused two arguments: first, that defendants engaged in 
“a conspiracy . . . to, at a minimum, deny, block, and/or obstruct access to, or knowledge 
concerning, deposited and looted assets and profits derived from slave labor” and sec-
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Domestic theories used in mass product liability cases, such as 
the “fraud on the market” theory, were employed by the Holo-
caust plaintiffs in the case against the Swiss banks. Using col-
lective liability theories from domestic law, plaintiffs claimed 
that the Swiss banks together owned 75-80% of market share, 
based on the size of the banks.239 The plaintiffs also contended 
that the level of specificity required in pleading was reduced by 
this alternative liability theory.240 Plaintiffs argued that it was 
too difficult to determine which Swiss Bank accepted, cloaked, 
or looted assets, and that the “problems of proof related directly 
to defendant banks’ actions since they ‘negligently failed to 
maintain and/or purposefully concealed proofs which exist or 
may have existed and affirmatively obstructed access to such 
proofs.’ ”241 In litigating human rights class claims, other legal 
presumptions could be used to avoid requiring individual proof 
of causation where the defendant’s duplicitous conduct made it 
difficult or impossible for alleged victims to discover the cause 
or source of harm.  So long as there is proof of defendant’s ille-
gal activity and injury to the group, individual proof should not 
 
ond, that the defendants are liable under “market share liability.” Plaintiffs’ Memo-
randum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Standing, Failure 
to State Claims Upon Which Relief Can be Granted, Failure to Join Indispensable Par-
ties, and Motion to Strike Punitive Damages at 5, In re Holocaust Victims Assets, No. 
CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 1997). 
 239. See Ramasastry, supra note 181, at 380-81. Relying on New York law, the 
plaintiffs argued (1) that problems unique to the case made it impracticable to prove 
which defendant caused the injury; (2) that all defendants engaged in tortious conduct; 
(3) that the problems of proof were related to the conduct itself; and (4) that there was 
no other effective remedy. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307, 1329 
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Collective liability provides both a basis for establishing a defen-
dant’s liability where proof of causation is impossible and a method of apportioning 
damages between liable codefendants.”); Neuborne Memorandum, supra note 60. 
 240. Under New York law, “liability here is based upon chance, not upon the fair 
assessment of the acts of defendants.” See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly, 73 N.Y.2d 487, 513 
(1989). 
 241. Ramasastry, supra note 181, at 380 (citation omitted). The defendants’ re-
sponded that collective liability merely eased plaintiffs’ burden of proof, but plaintiffs 
must still produce evidence that each defendant was engaged in the alleged wrongdo-
ing. See Defendant’s Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Partial Motion to 
Dismiss Common-Law Claims for Failure to State a Claim at 15 n.45, In re Holocaust 
Victims Assets, No. CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. July 9, 1997). Also, “in order to seek dis-
gorgement of assets due to unjust enrichment, plaintiffs must be able to trace assets 
directly that relate to their injuries and connect their claims to individual defen-
dant[s].” Ramasastry, supra note 181, at 380. However, the plaintiffs argued that the 
banks’ commingling of assets made it impossible to extricate the identification of indi-
vidual property that was looted and disposed of by the banks. See id. 
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be required.242  
As courts draw from domestic mass litigation to simplify 
the adjudication of mass human rights torts, they create more 
precedent for the expanded interpretations of CIL and collec-
tive rights adjudication.243 Even class actions that settle before 
a full trial on the merits have the power to affect the substan-
tive development of human rights law. 
D. Settlement and Subclassing 
The reality of mass tort litigation, including human rights 
litigation, is that most cases will end in settlement. The Su-
preme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, however, 
made it clear that courts, even in settlement classes, must de-
termine whether all of Rule 23(a)’s requirements are met.244 
Where class members have suffered different harm as a result 
of the corporate defendant’s conduct, implicating the common-
ality and typicality requirements, the court may divide the 
class into subclasses pursuant to 23(c)(4)(B).245 By dividing a 
class, a judge may be able to redefine the responsibilities of 
class attorneys and named plaintiffs in terms of the interests of 
distinct and relatively unified portions of a class. For example, 
in the Swiss Bank settlement, the plaintiffs’ class was divided 
into five subclasses based upon the type of injury alleged: De-
posited Assets Class, Looted Assets Class, Slave Labor Classes 
I and II (divided into groups of victims of Nazi persecution who 
actually performed slave labor and all other individuals who 
 
 242. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 904 n.19 (9th Cir. 1975). Similarly, 
courts grapple with the propriety of generalized proof of impact in antitrust class ac-
tions, which are concerns not present in human rights litigation. 
 243. Such transformations of CIL principles have occurred in other human rights 
litigation. For example, in Doe v. Unocal, the court determined that the Burmese plain-
tiffs had sufficiently stated a claim by alleging that Unocal participated in acts of 
forced labor, which was enough like slave trading to constitute a violation of the law of 
nations for ATCA jurisdiction. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 892 (C.D. 
Cal. 1997). 
 244. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619-28 (1997) (finding 
that no commonality or adequate representation existed among the class because the 
claimants had different levels of exposure, different severities and types of diseases, 
and came from states whose laws varied widely on several issues); Walker v. Liggett 
Group, 175 F.R.D. 226, 228 (S.D. W. Va. 1997) (denying class certification in light of 
Amchem); Leading Case, supra note 101, at 350. 
 245. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626 (emphasizing subclassing as means for dealing 
with predominance problems). 
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performed slave labor), and Refugee Class.246 The necessity for 
ranking of class interests by the parties may therefore diminish 
while the likelihood that diverse absentee interests will be pre-
sented to the court increases due to subclassing. Subclassing, 
however, is possible only if different class members coalesce 
into discrete, identifiable groups. Often, differences among 
class members will not divide along clearly defined lines.247 The 
litigation for each subclass is treated as a separate lawsuit, ap-
plying the same rules of class definition discussed above.248 
Class action settlement in human rights litigation offers 
unique opportunities for increased dialogue between interna-
tional actors, including nongovernmental organizations and 
public interest groups.249 Greater dialogue on compensation 
schemes, terms of settlement for injunctive relief that involves 
changes in corporate and government policies, and public ac-
knowledgment of wrongs promote one of the key objectives of 
the plaintiffs’ classes: to have broad statements of rights ac-
knowledged on the international level. Moreover, it is currently 
 
 246. See Swiss Bank Settlement, In re Holocaust Victims Assets, No. CV 96-4849 
(E.D.N.Y., Settlement Jan. 26, 1999). The refugee class consists of victims or targets of 
Nazi persecution who sought entry into Switzerland to avoid Nazi persecution and who 
actually, or allegedly, either denied entry into Switzerland or were deported, detained, 
abused, or mistreated, after gaining entry. See Marilyn Henry, Victims of Omission, 
JERUSALEM POST, July 23, 1999, available in 1999 WL 9006150. The refugee class also 
includes the 
individuals’ heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, who have or at any time 
have asserted, assert, or may in the future seek to assert, claims against any 
(Swiss bank, enterprise or institution) for relief of any kind whatsoever relating 
to . . . the alleged denial of entry, deportation, detention, abuse, or other mistreat-
ment. 
Id. The defendant banks agreed to the inclusion of the refugee class as a condition of 
the settlement at the insistence of the Swiss government, as the refugees made no 
claims against the banks directly. See id. 
 247. See Developments in the Law – Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1479-82 
(1976). 
 248. There must be a proper class representative for each subclass, and all other 
requirements of Rule 23 must be satisfied. See Betts v. Reliable Collection Agency, 
Ltd., 659 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 249. See Holocaust Payout Plan is Ready: Cash Next Year for Victims, Relatives, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 29, 1999, at A04; Netanyahu Holds Summit Over Share-Out 
of Nazi-Era Assets, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 31, 1998, available in 1999 WL 
16589428 (both articles mentioning involvement of public interest groups as part of 
discussion over Swiss Bank settlement); see also Beth Gardiner, Survivors Upset Over 
Swiss Bank Case, AP ONLINE, Aug. 24, 1999, available in 1999 WL 22036918 (mention-
ing opinion of a party to the Swiss bank settlement regarding amounts of plaintiffs’ 
claims). The dialogue between the Swiss banks and the Swiss government resulted in 
the inclusion of the Refugee class. See Henry, supra note 232. 
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accepted that collective remedies may actually be a more accu-
rate means for just compensation than many individual 
cases.250 As discussed, current class action procedure offers 
creative group remedies to address widespread harm to ethnic 
minority groups, thereby giving teeth to evolving notions of col-
lective human rights. 
IV. CLASS PROCEDURE AND CORPORATE COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. Achieving Compliance 
Enforcement of human rights law has been problematic 
from its inception.251 Large corporations, while global actors on 
economic levels, are rarely accountable for transnational harm 
to human rights.252 In fact, multinationals have operated in a 
virtual legal and moral vacuum.253 Public international law has 
failed “to address the post-World War II emergence of [multi-
nationals] as a major international force.”254 Moreover, the nar-
row view of international law as relations between states al-
lows large corporations to evade accountability at the domestic 
level by shifting production between sites. The absence of in-
 
 250. See Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing, supra note 19, at 215-
16 (1996); Michael J. Saks & Peter D. Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized 
Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815 
(1992); see also Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 19, at 577 (“Professors Saks 
and Blanck “argued that the average of sample case verdicts is likely to be more accu-
rate than an individual trial verdict for many mass tort cases.” (citing Saks & Blanck, 
supra)). 
 251. Victims can report to international and domestic governmental and non-
governmental organizations but cannot count on them to stop an ongoing violation, 
punish the wrongdoer, or order compensation. See RICHARD B. LILLICH, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:  PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 8 (1991). 
Regional human rights bodies are somewhat more effective than U.N. human rights 
bodies. See id. at 591. The Inter-American Commission issues decisions that are only 
recommendations. See id. at 592. 
 252. See Frey, supra note 12, at 153-54, 157 (1997) (constructing a continuum of 
governmental, nongovernmental, private, transnational corporations to protect human 
rights according to the corporation’s level of activity in the country). 
 253. See THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 31 (1989) 
(“[W]ith the exception of a handful of nation-states, multinationals are alone in pos-
sessing the size, technology, and economic reach necessary to influence human affairs 
on a global basis.”). 
 254. Geer, supra note 11, at 335-37 (mapping the context for international legal 
rights analysis and the role of multinational oil corporations in the ethnocide of indige-
nous groups in Amazonia). 
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ternational standards increases corporations’ ability to avoid 
responsibility.255 Multinationals are not legally accountable in 
any system except their host country.256 Furthermore, the prob-
lem with such limited accountability is that the alleged viola-
tions often involve the collusion of corporate entities and gov-
ernments. 
Some human rights covenants do place limitations on indi-
vidual or corporate actions when defining fundamental 
rights.257 However, these covenants do not expressly hold cor-
porations responsible for affirmatively protecting human rights 
or taking steps to prevent others from violating those rights. 
International legal liability, therefore, does not usually apply to 
corporations but rather to the governments that regulate 
them.258 
Since the 1970s, there has been some increased pressure to 
regulate the behavior of non-state actors in the realm of human 
rights within the U.N. system, with the fairly recent push for 
corporate codes of conduct.259 These codes originally sought to 
“prevent interference with the internal politics of host coun-
 
 255. See id. 
 256. See id; see also Sacharoff, supra note 86, at 927 (1998).  Many host countries 
have self-protection regulatory measures such as ownership restrictions for foreign in-
vestment. See Amy Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between 
Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 289 & n.491, 
290-91 (1995). 
 257. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Annex, 
Art. 29-30, U.N. Doc. A/777 (1948); Civil and Political Covenant, Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. No. 16 art. 5(1), U.N. Cov. A/6316 (1966). 
 258. See Frey, supra note 12, at 163. See generally FRANK C. NEWMAN & DAVID 
WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, POLICY AND PROCESS 5-17 (2d ed. 
1996) (stating that U.N. documents bind governments not non-state actors). 
 259. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 527, 528, U.N. Doc. 
A/9559 (1974) (recognizing the rights of the state to control the activities of transna-
tional corporations acting within its borders and calling for a code of conduct that 
would prevent economic exploitation of host countries); E.S.C. Res. 1913, U.N. ESCOR, 
57th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. 5570/Add. 1 (1975) (establishing the U.N. 
Commission on transnational corporations comprised of members from 48 states to 
formulate a code of conduct); E.S.C. Res. 1908, U.N. ESCOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 
13, U.N. Doc. E/5570 (1974); Development and International Economic Co-Operation: 
Transnational Corporations, U.N. ESCOR, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (1990) (at-
tempting to strike balance between competing interests of regulating corporate conduct 
and setting standards for nondiscriminatory host government behavior towards corpo-
rations); see also Daniel B. Magraw, Introduction to United Nations ECOSOC Draft 
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, in 1 BASIC DOCUMENTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 533-38 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 
1990) (describing the history and purpose of the U.N. MNC Code of Conduct effort). 
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tries and, to limiting [sic] the adverse effects of TNC [transna-
tional corporations] activities on national economic objec-
tives.”260 The economic and political conditions that gave rise to 
the initial calls for a universal corporate code have changed be-
cause developing countries are now faced with an acute short-
fall of investment.261 The new goal is to “reintegrate developing 
countries into the global economy in a manner that ensures in-
flows of new investment capital.”262 Recently, the relationship 
between multinationals and host countries has shifted. “TNCs 
are no longer seen as suspicious intruders . . . but rather, as 
welcome and wealthy guests.”263 Host countries are now more 
open to inward foreign investment and the activities of trans-
national corporations.264 In 1993, the U.N. abandoned its fif-
teen-year effort to create a code of conduct for transnational 
corporations.265 The history of the draft code represents grow-
ing compromise by those states advocating multinational con-
trol of their original objectives. Consequently, corporations 
have enormous influence, both positive and negative, both in 
home countries and abroad, without any international human 
rights law that applies to them.266 
Moreover, there have been few successful domestic legisla-
tive efforts to specifically regulate corporations on human 
 
 260. Frey, supra note 12, at 158, 165-67. See also SIDNEY DELL, THE UNITED 
NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 24-26 (1990) (describing focus on regulating 
restrictive business practices); id. at 73-74 (discussing environmental exploitation, an-
titrust issues, and truth in business dealings) ; MUCHLINSKI, supra note 1, at 457, 593-
94; Mark Baker, Private Codes of Corporate Conduct: Should the Fox Guard the Hen-
house?, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 399, 411 (1992-93) (noting the purposes of pri-
vate codes of conduct and assessing their usefulness). 
 261. See Frey, supra note 12, at 160 (“Due to world economic and ideological 
shifts, there has been a retreat from the international control model that was in vogue 
in the 1960s and 1970s regarding [transnational corporations]. States once critical of 
[transnational corporations] now find themselves competing for the benefits of foreign 
direct investment from multinational companies.”). 
 262. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 1, at 596; see also Frey, supra note 12, at 158. 
 263. Frey, supra note 12, at 167. 
 264. In 1994, the Commission on Transnational Corporations became the Com-
mission on the International Investment and Transnational Corporations. See id. at 
167 n.75 (citing Transnational Corporations Report, U.N. Doc. TD/B/42(1)/4 (1995), at 4 
(“Within today’s globalized world economy, characterized by increased interplay be-
tween investment, trade, technology and services, member States placed increased em-
phasis on the contribution that transnational corporations could make to growth and 
development.”). 
 265. See Geer, supra note 11, at 353 n.74. 
 266. See MUCHLINSKI, supra note 1, at 8-10; Frey, supra note 12, at 159-60. 
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rights issues.267 Economic sanctions have been sporadically 
used as a tool to punish offending governments, which may di-
rectly impact corporations doing or seeking business in these 
countries.268 Executive action seeking to encourage self-
regulation by the corporations has also had limited success.269 
Finally, self-regulation appears to occur only in response to 
the pressure of legal sanctions.270 In the case of the Holocaust 
class actions, companies such as Daimler-Chrysler, Deutsche 
Bank, Siemens, Volkswagen, Hoesct, Dresdner Bank, Krupp, 
Alliance BASF, Bauer, BMW, and Degussa have announced 
plans to participate in a $1.3-1.7 billion government fund pro-
posed by German Chancellor Schroeder and created to compen-
sate Holocaust victims and their heirs. The fund is to be estab-
lished on condition that the class suits against the companies 
be dropped.271 Also, U.S. and European insurance commission-
ers finally created a $90 million fund to redress wrongs alleged 
 
 267. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 101 passim, 
91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (barring American companies from bribing officials of foreign gov-
ernments). The most comprehensive legislative response to human rights was the 
Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986 (Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
99-440, § 101 passim, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986) (repealed 1993)), which contained a code of 
conduct that required protection of human rights. Id. § 208, 100 Stat. 1097-98. Legisla-
tion introduced in 1995 by Senator Mitch McConnell proposed to ban U.S. investment 
in, and trade with, Burma. The Burma Freedom and Democracy Act, modeled after the 
Anti-Apartheid Act, sought to prohibit investments that supported the abusive Bur-
mese military governments. See, e.g., Janelle M. Diller & David A. Levy, Child Labor, 
Trade and Investment: Toward the Harmonization of International Law, 91 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 663 (1997); Frey, supra note 12, at 169-73 (discussing the limited legislative 
efforts to regulate multinationals on human rights issues and the executive initiatives 
regarding the Model Business Principles). See generally 141 CONG. REC. § 211; see also 
the Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1995, § 706, 104th Cong. (1995) (prohibiting the im-
portation of goods produced abroad with labor of children under fifteen years old). 
 268. See, e.g., Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1995) (regu-
lating economic sanctions against North Korea and other countries in the areas of 
sales, purchases, specifically designated nationals, sending gifts); Iran and Libya Sanc-
tions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 101 passim, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996) (requiring 
the President to commence diplomatic efforts with U.S. allies to establish multilateral 
trade sanctions); Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 
22 U.S.C. § 6032 (1994) (urging the President to apply sanctions against countries as-
sisting Cuba); Frey, supra note 12, at 168-69. 
 269. Self-regulation was proposed by the Clinton Administration in the form of 
Model Business Principles. See Frey, supra note 12, at 158-59, 171-73; Baker, supra 
note 260. 
 270. See Geer, supra note 11, at 353 n.74. See generally Matthew Lippman, Multi-
national Corporations and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 
COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION 392-401 (Richard Claude & Burns H. Weston eds., 
1992); Sacharoff, supra note 86, at 935-37. 
 271. See Letter from Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, supra note 60. 
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by the class action plaintiffs, such as refusing to pay premiums 
of policyholders in concentration camps and “requiring nonexis-
tent death certificates of the murdered policyholders.”272 
Therefore, because the enforcement of human rights has 
been problematic, class action suits offer a means for deterring 
corporate activity harming large groups of victims. 
B. Forum Access for the Human Rights Class 
1. Sovereignty and enforcement of international human rights 
law in domestic forums 
Enforcement of human rights law against corporations has 
been difficult in part due to notions of sovereignty which con-
strain the application of domestic law extraterritorially. Thus, 
victims of human rights abuses often lack access to courts.273 
To preserve world order, courts and governments must co-
operate to create legal systems that protect both international 
human rights and transnational capitalist interests.274 Specifi-
cally, as a participant in the international community, the 
United States is obligated to provide remedies for victims of in-
ternational atrocities.275 The rule of law cannot be achieved 
without access to the courts. The principle that mandates that 
civil claims be capable of submission to a judge “ranks as one of 
the universally ‘recognised’ fundamental principles of law; the 
 
 272. Collins, supra note 183, at 18. See also Winters v. Assicurazioni Generali 
S.p.A., No. 98-CV-09186 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 30, 1998); Drucker Cornell v. Assicurazi-
oni, No. 97-CV-02262 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 31, 1997). 
 273. See infra note 274 and accompanying text. 
 274. The alternative would be primitive systems of self-help and sanctions often 
through mercenaries (gangs or illicit mobs, illegal drug cartels, and global conspiracies 
run by enterprises) to enforce bargains and social norms through private customs and 
informal codes. Cf. Christenson, supra note 5. 
 275. The right to a remedy contained in Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights affirms that “[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the 
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by 
the constitution or by law.” Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 8, G.A. Res. 
217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1 U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); see Jordan Paust, Draft Brief 
Concerning Claims to Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Human Rights: Nonimmunity 
for Violations of International Law Under the FSIA, 8 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 49 (1985); Vi-
enna Convention on International Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, in 8 
I.L.M. 679 (imposing obligation on signatory states “to refrain from acts which would 
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty”); cf. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 153 (3d ed. 1993) (international law imposes obligations 
on nations, but does not regulate how nations treat these obligations). 
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same is true of the principle of international law which forbids 
the denial of justice.”276 
When providing remedies for victims of human rights 
abuses, compliance with international norms is achieved 
through the internalization, or incorporation, of CIL into do-
mestic law. When domestic courts adjudicate international 
class action claims, their judicial interpretation and application 
of substantive human rights norms reinforce CIL principles at 
the international level.277 
The evolution of CIL raises concerns of whether this inter-
nationalization of domestic law undermines the executive sov-
ereignty and whether a judicially internationalized law of na-
tions threatens the normative structure within which the 
interaction among sovereigns takes place.278 However, courts 
have traditionally supplemented—not replaced—executive ac-
tion through transnational litigation for the protection of 
transnational corporations.279 Private enterprises demand that 
courts and administrative agencies safeguard investment and 
provide reasonable regularity in transnational business deal-
ings and risk.280 U.S. federal courts have internalized interna-
tional law to affirmatively support transnational production 
and exchange based upon free markets, trade, and investment 
whenever the political branches or common law give the slight-
est grounds for incorporating these expectations as federal 
law.281 To hold, then, that the protection of universal human 
rights is beyond the purview of judicial power without political 
direction—either affirmatively by public entitlements or nega-
 
 276. Golfer v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶¶ 34-35 (1975), re-
printed in R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF 
LAW AND POLICY 563, 570-71 (1979). 
 277. See Steinhardt, supra note 4, at 46. 
 278. See Morgan, supra note 39, at 67. 
 279. See id. at 74-83; see also Koh, supra note 41, at 24-25, 39, 43, 54, 60; Edward 
M. Morgan, Act of Blindness, State of Insight, 13 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 22-23, 32 (1995). 
 280. See Gordon A. Christenson, Federal Courts and World Civil Society, 6 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y, 405, 427, 429-30 (1997). 
 281. For example, merchant law, maritime law, and prize law from the law of na-
tions is incorporated as rules of decision. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospa-
tiale v. District Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987) (dealing with pre-trial discovery); INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (involving refugee status); Steinhardt, supra 
note 4, at 11 (citing Chan v. Korean Airlines, 109 S. Ct. 1676 (1989)) (stating that pri-
vate parties routinely use domestic courts to enforce international rules governing in-
vestment, trade, civil aviation, pre-trial discovery, banking, commercial transactions, 
and refugee status). See generally Christenson, supra note 280. 
BOYD-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:18 AM 
1139] COLLECTIVE RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 1199 
tively by restraining abuses of public and private power—is 
misguided. 
2. Internalizing international human rights law creates 
precedent 
On the flip side of internalizing international law into do-
mestic law is the transporting of domestic precedent from 
ATCA jurisprudence to other domestic and international 
fora.282 In class adjudication of human rights, U.S. courts par-
ticipate in CIL enforcement through judicial pronouncement of 
norms and enforcement of class remedies.283 U.S. courts have 
traditionally been reluctant to extend domestic law extraterri-
torially unless a U.S. interest was directly involved; however, 
the rapid rise of international trade and investment and the 
appearance of multinationals is weakening adherence to this 
principle.284 The extension of universal CIL, on the other hand, 
should be less problematic as CIL is, by definition, accepted by 
states, as evidenced by their practices and their psychological 
acquiescence.285 Therefore, sovereignty concerns diminish when 
applying CIL to foreign conduct.286 The judicial expression of 
CIL principles concerning collective rights is then available as 
precedent in international and other domestic fora.287 
 
 282. See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra Parts II & III. 
 284. See, e.g., Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (Holmes, J.) (“Acts 
done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects 
within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if [a defendant] had 
been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its 
power.”). 
 285. See supra INTRODUCTION. 
 286. See Michael Goldsmith & Vicki Rinne, Civil RICO, Foreign Defendants, and 
“ET”, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1023, 1024-34 (1989). 
 287. In recent decisions, the International Tribunal and the House of Lords have 
cited domestic law as precedent. See Regina v. Bartle, 37 I.L.M. 1302, 1324 (H.L., Nov. 
25, 1998) (United Kingdom House of Lords: Regina v. Bartle and the Commission of 
Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte Pinochet, citing Filàrtiga v. Peña-Irala, 
630 F.2d 876 (1980) as precedent that torture has jus cogens status in international 
law); UK High Court of Justice, Queens Bench Division, In re Pinochet Ugarte, 38 
I.L.M. 68, 84 (Oct. 28, 1998) (citing Marcos and Filàrtiga as precedent); Prosecutor v. 
Tadic, Case IT-94-1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 36 
I.L.M. 908, 945, 946, 953 (May 7, 1997) (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 
1995) (liability for non-state actors), R. v. Finta, 1 S.C.R. 701, 222 n.167 (1994) (Cana-
dian case regarding requisite mental element for crime against humanity), and Quinn 
v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 799-801 (9th Cir. 1986) (grouping war crimes with crimes 
against humanity). 
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In essence, the federal courts, in applying their domestic 
class procedures to international human rights claims, not only 
internalize international human rights norms into domestic 
law but also participate in a dialogue with international insti-
tutions by establishing precedent for international human 
rights norms.288 Given the dearth of federal choice of law rules 
for transnational litigation,289 courts may now create an ad hoc 
mixture of situs law for determining the definition of tortious 
conduct under CIL and compensatory damages.290 In addition, 
the possibility that a federal court adjudicating a transnational 
case may find that remedies such as punitive damages are 
available under international law provides parties suing under 
CIL a remedy unavailable to foreign plaintiffs suing under 
other theories.291 Transnational choice of law rules applied in 
U.S. federal courts may allow punitive damages, subjecting 
“deep-pocket” corporate defendants to U.S.-style discovery of 
their financial worth, which would be unavailable in other in-
ternational fora.292 Plaintiffs can then arguably demand such 
discovery be available to enforce their international rights in a 
non-U.S. forum. 
Beyond expanded remedies, the nature of transnational 
plaintiffs’ rights under international law is expanded.293 For-
eign plaintiffs should be able to draw upon this newly devel-
oped body of law to enforce their rights in other fora. Such a 
dialogue is key to global corporate actors’ compliance and the 
enforcement of international human rights. 
 
 288. See Koh, supra note 18, at 2353-54, 2371, 2374. 
 289. Cf. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal 
Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1 (1991). 
 290. Id. at 3; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(3) 
& (4) & cmt. H (1987).  
 291. In the absence of a federal statute, the law governing choice of law is state 
law. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 6 (1971). See also Christenson, supra note 
280, at 446, 515; Steinhardt, supra note 19, at 93-96 (stating that rules of decision may 
defer to place in which alleged abuse occurred, international law for determining juris-
diction under § 1350 and punitive damages and the forum law for procedural issues 
such as abatement). 
 292. Cf. Kurt Riechenberg, The Recognition of Foreign Privilege in United States 
Discovery Proceedings, 9 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 80, 92-93, 136 (noting the lesser dis-
covery privileges available in international tribunals). 
 293. See supra Part II. 
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 V. CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 
In domestic civil procedure, many commentators have ar-
gued in favor of collectivized class treatment of mass tort 
claims, while others have posited that class treatment threat-
ens individual autonomy and the concept of each individual’s 
right to a “day in court.”294 In the human rights context, similar 
arguments may be made.295 However, when viewed in light of 
human rights policies, the criticism of class procedure is nei-
ther theoretically nor practically justified. 
A. Autonomy Versus Collective Justice 
Class actions have been problematic since the Advisory 
Committee’s admonition that mass tort actions were largely 
unsuitable for class treatment.296 Some problems have arisen 
because class actions are an exception to the deeply ingrained 
rule that a person is bound by judicial proceedings only if he or 
she is a party.297 Inherent in the prolific discourse surrounding 
 
 294. See Shapiro, supra note 108, at 923; see also C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL 
COURTS (5th ed. 1994). In other mass tort contexts, courts have recently exercised cau-
tion with the class action, perhaps in reaction to more aggressive attempts to aggregate 
cases under Rule 23 and the lack of careful analysis of its requirements; courts have 
refused to certify broad classes or have overturned certification by district courts. In 
denying class certification, courts have reiterated the potential for prejudice inherent 
in class certification. See, e.g., In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1078-79 
(6th Cir. 1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299-1304 (7th Cir. 
1995); Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 475-76 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Castano 
v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 555 (E.D. La. 1995), rev’d, 84 F.3d 734 (5th 
Cir. 1996). Futures classes and the issues they present have been the subject of sub-
stantial judicial attention. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 617 
(3d Cir. 1996), aff’d sub nom., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 
(1997); In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963, 975 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated sub nom., Ortiz 
v. Fibreboard Corp., 521 U.S. 1114 (1997). “Judges and scholars have assessed and de-
bated questions such as how to ensure that absent class” members are adequately rep-
resented, especially when those members are truly passive as with a futures class. 
Mollie A. Murphy, The Intersystem Class Settlement: Of Comity, Consent, and Collu-
sion, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 413, 414 (Jan. 1999). See also id. at 413 n.2. 
 295. Indeed, the only analysis of class treatment of mass human rights claims 
warned that class treatment may threaten the autonomy of individual litigant victims 
suing under the ATCA. See Steinhardt, supra note 4. 
 296. Murphy, supra note 294, at 413 n.1; see Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit In-
junctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1148, 1149 (1998) (“Class actions occupy an uneasy place in American jurispru-
dence.”); see, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1183 (8th Cir. 1982); 
Mertens v. Abbott Lab., 99 F.R.D. 38, 40 (D.N.H. 1983). 
 297. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (describing general “ ‘deep-
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class actions is the debate between the advocates of individual 
autonomy in litigation and the proponents of collective jus-
tice.298 The modern class action challenges ideas of individual 
autonomy by allowing a representative of the group to make 
decisions affecting the group’s rights and remedies.299 
1. Collective justice 
Advocates of the class action as a means toward collective 
justice reason that the aggregation of claims through the class 
action is the most efficient way of promoting individual jus-
tice.300 Heeding efficiency considerations in class treatment re-
sults in better substantive outcomes for class members than if 
they were to litigate in a series of individual actions.301 These 
advocates argue in favor of collectivized treatment based on 
economies of scale such as pooling of resources and information 
and reduced counsel costs. In addition to saving resources, the 
distributional equities that “flow from a system that allocates 
compensation to victims on the basis of expected average harm, 
as compared to the vastly greater expense and ‘luck of the 
draw’ that play a role in the outcome in each of a series of indi-
 
rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court’ ”) (quoting 
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 18 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4449, at 417 
(1981)); see also YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 12-13; Monaghan, supra note 296, at 1149. 
 298. The topic and controversy of class actions is significantly in the forefront of 
legal and academic discourse. See Shapiro, supra note 108, at 913 n.2 (listing the more 
important legal works on the subject of class actions). 
 299. The modern class action is an exception to the individualistic tradition of An-
glo-American law, political theory, and philosophy. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 2. 
The apparent undermining of individual autonomy inherent in Anglo-American legal 
tradition spurred controversy around the class action among the general public and 
within the legal profession. See id. at 8-9. See also Rosenberg, Individual Justice and 
Collectivizing, supra note 19, at 212 (“Criticism of collectivized resolution of mass-tort 
cases proceeds from the standard universalist conception of individual justice that 
holds sway in civil procedure discourse.”); Mass Torts Problems & Proposals, in REPORT 
ON MASS TORT LITIGATION 3, App. C, Feb. 15, 1999 (containing the report of the Advi-
sory Committee on Civil Rules and the Working Group on Mass Torts to the Chief Jus-
tice of the United States and to the Judicial Conference of the United States). 
 300. See Shapiro, supra note 108, at 916 n.4; Rosenberg, Individual Justice and 
Collectivizing, supra note 19, at 210-16. But see JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL 
JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION (1995). 
 301. See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic 
Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994); Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 19; 
Rosenberg, Individual Justice by Collective Means, supra note 19, at 563-73; Rosen-
berg, Justice and Collectivizing, supra note 19, at 236-52; Shapiro, supra note 108, at 
928. 
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vidual adjudications,” weigh in favor of collective treatment.302 
Moreover, it is arguable that the “day in court” ideal does not 
actually give participants control over litigation as a practical 
matter.303 
Collective justice arguments may also be made in favor of 
class treatment of human rights claims. Given the difficulty of 
litigating CIL claims under the ATCA, in which alien plaintiffs 
sue multinational or foreign defendants for offenses that oc-
curred abroad, the costs of most human rights cases are exorbi-
tant, and aggregate treatment is, therefore, justified.304 Most 
plaintiffs who have been victimized by mass human rights vio-
lations lack the financial or political capability to initiate indi-
vidual adjudication and would choose aggregate recovery over 
none at all.305 Also, given the political and economic power of 
corporate defendants, the aggregation of claims and the possi-
bility of collective remedies in class actions may be the only 
hope to deter mass human rights violations.306 
2. Preserving autonomy 
While I have suggested that in collective rights claims re-
medial procedures should address the class as an entity, tradi-
tional class action mechanisms, such as notice, opt out, and in-
dividual trials on damages or common questions of liability, in 
Rule 23(b)(3) classes are still available.307 For instance, where 
discrepancies in the types and levels of injuries among human 
rights victims308 undermine class cohesion and make the pre-
 
 302. Shapiro, supra note 108, at 928. 
 303. See Rosenberg, Individual Justice by Collective Means, supra note 19, at 582-
83, n.86 (“[T]here is no reality to the notion that claimants have significant personal 
influence or involvement, let alone control regarding the course of litigation and set-
tlement, other than wielding some degree of ultimate veto power over the settlement 
price.”). 
 304. Cf. Jack B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on United States Group Actions, 45 
AM. J. COMP. L. 833, 836 (1997). 
 305. See supra Part II.B. 
 306. See infra Part V.B.2. (on deterrence goals); supra Part III (on collective reme-
dies). 
 307. See Swiss Bank Settlement, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV 96-4849, 
(E.D.N.Y. Settlement, Jan. 26, 1999). The class was given option of timely request to 
opt out. The Settlement specified that the court had discretion to request members to 
describe the nature and amount of any claims that the member may wish to assert in 
the future. 
 308. For example, often victims do not manifest injuries from exposure to envi-
ronmental contamination at the same time other victims do. See Leading Case, supra 
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dominance requirement difficult to meet, such as when some 
class members have not yet manifest injuries from exposure to 
environmental contamination,309 individual trials may be con-
ducted in the country where the majority of plaintiffs reside.310 
Rule 23’s built-in procedural safeguards address and satisfy 
autonomy concerns. For example, inherent in the class proce-
dure to safeguard individual autonomy is the representation 
requirement, which grows out of the assumption that every in-
dividual has a right to strategic choice in all cases.311 This re-
quirement ensures that a court will inquire into the interests of 
the individual class members. 
Under Hansberry v. Lee, the determination of whether the 
named plaintiff represents the interests of the class is actually 
an inquiry into individually expressed desires to enforce 
rights.312 Where the class interests are collective in nature, 
each plaintiff’s claim is based upon harm done to the group, so 
individual interests are uniform. Therefore, the representation 
inquiry ensures that class members’ interests are repre-
sented.313 Thus, where intraclass conflicts are minimal due to 
claims under CIL being based upon harm done to the group, 
the representative plaintiff (so long as they belonged to the 
group at the time of the harm) will be adequate to safeguard 
the interests of each member. 
In addition, the notice requirement helps preserve individ-
ual autonomy in class cases. Notice to the Rule 23(b)(3) class 
allows unnamed plaintiffs to: 1) monitor performance of class 
representatives and class counsel; 2) object to a proposed set-
tlement in 23(e) settlement cases; and 3) enter appearance 
through counsel. Also, notice enables class members to opt out 
 
note 101, at 354. 
 309. See id. 
 310. Paul A. Volcker, Dormant Accounts in Swiss Banks: The Independent Com-
mittee of Eminent Persons, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 513, 515-17 (1998). 
 311. This assumption has been questioned by scholars advocating the collectiviza-
tion of claims and broader preclusion rules. See supra Parts III.A & III.B.1; Bone, Re-
thinking, supra note 19, at 198-200, 236-37 (noting that some commentators equate 
participation with representation); Lawrence C. George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: Park-
lane Hosiery and the Collateral Class Action, 32 STAN L. REV. 655, 678-79 (1980). 
 312. Ironically, the consent requirement is present only in (b)(3) actions in which 
interests are less socially ambiguous than in mandatory class action suits that do not 
require individual consent. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 255-61. 
 313. Moreover, subclassing under Rule 23(c)(4), wherein a representative is as-
signed for each subclass, will ensure that the interests are uniform among members 
and adequately represented by the named plaintiff. 
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of the class and pursue individual remedies.314 Adequate notice 
may be accomplished even if some class members cannot be 
identified.315 Courts have fashioned elaborate notice schemes 
that meet constitutional requirements,316 even for class mem-
bers outside the U.S.317 Such schemes are being used in current 
human rights litigation and effectively preserve procedural 
rights of the human rights plaintiffs.318 In the Swiss Bank set-
tlement, the court mandated that notice be sent to dozens of 
countries and in various languages by mail and in newspaper 
advertisements to nearly 900,000 potential beneficiaries of the 
$1.2 billion settlement. Approximately $25 million will be 
taken from the settlement proceeds to cover notice costs, thus 
raising policy concerns that such elaborate notice schemes are 
counter-productive.319 
While notice attempts to preserve the participatory rights 
of the individual members of a (b)(3) class, the logic behind the 
notice requirement has been questioned by scholars and, in-
deed, its efficacy in human rights classes may be doubted.320 
Particularly when the collective rights of the group as an entity 
are being adjudicated, the case for strict adherence to notice 
seems less compelling.321 The “right” to notice in human rights 
cases should be reexamined in light of the real costs and bene-
fits involved. Arguments for viewing the class as a litigant may 
call for more selective notice so long as an adequately represen-
 
 314. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). 
 315. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 
(1950); Vancouver Women’s Health Collective Soc’y v. A.H. Robins Co., 820 F.2d 1359, 
1364 (4th Cir. 1987) (approving publication as a procedure by which A.H. Robins would 
give worldwide notice of its bankruptcy proceedings); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 
B.R. 618, 626 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that in bankruptcy proceedings, notice 
by publication is constitutionally adequate “to those beneficiaries whose interests are 
either conjectural or future”). 
 316. See Philips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812-13 (1985). 
 317. The notice scheme in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor included hundreds of 
thousands of individual notices, a wide-ranging television and print campaign, and 
significant additional efforts by 35 international and national unions to notify their 
members. 521 U.S. 591, 640 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also In re “Agent Or-
ange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 1987) (notice by media). 
 318. See Swiss Bank Settlement, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV 96-4849 
(E.D.N.Y., Settlement Jan. 26, 1999). 
 319. See Marilyn Henry, Swiss Banks to Notify Potential Recipients, JERUSALEM 
POST, May 27, 1999, at 5. 
 320. See YEAZELL, supra note 19, at 247-48. 
 321. See Shapiro, supra note 108, at 936. 
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tative group is notified.322 “[V]iewing the class as the sole liti-
gating party does not undermine the value of requiring indi-
vidual notice to all those who can be identified with reasonable 
effort, so long as the cost is not so high as to sound the death 
knell of the action.”323 In addition, costs will likely be a problem 
for human rights plaintiffs because generally poverty or disen-
franchisement lie at the heart of their claims, and many classes 
of human rights victims rely on public interest counsel.324 Ac-
cordingly, in these cases, there is a strong argument that 
where the probabilities of plaintiffs’ success are great, the de-
fendant should be directed to pay costs of notice.325 
The opt out provision can also protect individual autonomy 
in class actions. Rule 23(c)(4) mandates that (b)(3) class mem-
bers be given the opportunity to opt out if they wish to pursue 
individual claims or to forgo claims altogether.326 For collective 
rights adjudication of human rights claims, a limited opportu-
nity to opt out may be more appropriate than traditional opt 
out rights. When a class seeks both monetary and injunctive 
relief or in cases where the substantive law mandates, a class 
would be treated as a (b)(2) rather than a (b)(3) class.327 The 
concerns of class adjudication that may form the basis of a 
 
 322. See id. 
 323. Id; see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 162 (1974). 
 324. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in 
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for 
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1991) (noting the costs of notice to named plain-
tiffs). 
 325. The Supreme Court has rejected this approach. See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 156. 
But see Shapiro, supra note 108, at 936 n.59. 
 326. Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), appeared to constitutional-
ize this requirement. See Shapiro, supra note 108, at 937-38 (discussing the need for 
reconsideration of opt out rights). In early class action jurisprudence, adequacy of rep-
resentation was all that was needed to satisfy due process requirements; notice to the 
class and opportunity to opt out were not required. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 
44-46 (1940); see also Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 362 (1921). 
 327. See Doe v. Karadzic, 182 F.R.D. 424, 426-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (involving plain-
tiffs who moved to opt out of (b)(1)(B) action under 23(d)(5) grant of narrow discretion-
ary powers; however, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion on grounds that withdrawal 
would jeopardize the potential class recovery and the moving plaintiffs were not ade-
quately distinguishable from the class). There have also been attempts to opt out of the 
Swiss Bank Settlement by named plaintiffs in the class, based upon a disagreement 
with the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded. These attempts to opt out illustrate the 
possible harmful effects of unlimited opt out rights. See Beth Gardiner, Survivors Upset 
Over Swiss Bank Case, AP ONLINE, Aug. 24, 1999, available in 1999 WL 22036918; cf. 
Holocaust Suit Parties Withdraw, THE RECORD (Northern New Jersey), Aug. 24, 1999, 
available in 1999 WL 7111633. 
BOYD-FIN.DOC 4/5/00  7:18 AM 
1139] COLLECTIVE RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 1207 
class member’s desire to opt out could be addressed through 
other means, such as caps on attorneys’ fees or punitive dam-
ages.328 Encouragement to remain in the class may be accom-
plished by a variety of creative means, such as providing that 
limited individual claims may go forward in fora with concur-
rent jurisdiction, so long as the class recovery amount is offset 
by any individual recovery amounts.329 
To the extent that human rights plaintiffs’ classes are 
treated as an entity with substantive rights founded in CIL 
principles of collective rights, opting out would undermine such 
interests and therefore may not be warranted, so long as it is 
not constitutionally mandated.330 In general, procedures such 
as opt out and notice designed to preserve individual autonomy 
are less compelling in the adjudication of collective human 
rights where shared interests are a prerequisite to the collec-
tive rights claims. Moreover, when balanced with considera-
tions of corporate deterrence of human rights abuses through 
group remedies, a policy toward disallowing opt out rights is 
justified. 
Given the difficulties in obtaining individual justice at the 
international level, class procedures do not compromise victims’ 
individual rights to participate. Unlike domestic litigation, 
rights to participate in the international judicial process are 
not widely acknowledged, likely due to the lack of civil redress 
 
 328. See Rosenberg, Individual Justice by Collective Means, supra note 19, at 594 
(advocating opt out for noncommon issues); Shapiro, supra note 108, at 938 (calling for 
conditional or limited opt out rights). For an in-depth discussion of the numerous ethi-
cal considerations for attorneys representing classes, including the issue of attorneys’ 
fees, see generally, Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 
NW. U. L. REV. 469 (1994). 
 329. In the Swiss Bank Settlement, for example, the settlement agreement incor-
porated provisions allowing plaintiffs to pursue claims with the Independent Claims 
Resolution Foundation, chaired by Paul A. Volcker, which was established to oversee a 
streamlined process for resolving claim to dormant accounts, so long as the claims tri-
bunal recovery was offset in the settlement recovery. See Swiss Bank Settlement at 
Art. 4, In re Holocaust Victim Assets, No. CV 96-4849 (E.D.N.Y., Settlement Jan. 26, 
1999). Such provisions would obviously cut down on plaintiffs opting-out of the class 
because they wished to pursue claims before the international tribunal. 
 330. The court in Karadzic dismissed the plaintiffs’ due process arguments. See 
Doe v. Karadzic, 182 F.R.D. at 428-29; see also Doe v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 0878, 1999 
WL 6360, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1999) (motion for interlocutory appeal on issue of 
motion to opt-out denied on ground that there is no due process right to opt out of 
(b)(1)(B) class); Shapiro, supra note 108, at 954-55 (suggesting that the opt-out rule is 
not constitutionally mandated, and if the entity model is validated by substantive law, 
the author suggests that the substantive interests of the class would be undermined if 
individual members could opt out at will). 
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for individuals at the international level.331 The class model, 
however, presents a limited way for groups or associations to 
bring legal claims in international fora.332 Non-state groups 
face additional obstacles because procedural rules are usually 
not well-developed. These procedural limitations are a result of 
the historically interstate character of the international legal 
system. More effective procedural norms are beginning to ap-
pear, due in part to the increasing transnationalization of the 
international legal system.333 However, “international bodies 
remain cautious when handling major claims by nonstate 
groups” partly because they “seek to maintain a universalist 
view of their practice,” thus avoiding setting precedent which 
may be inapplicable later due to political consequences.334 U.S. 
courts should be less wary of their precedent being binding in-
ternationally and more concerned about being one voice in the 
dialogue between international bodies.335 
B. Human Rights Objectives and Class Adjudication 
Collective adjudication of human rights claims is a means of 
implementing human rights objectives, promoting corrective 
justice for groups of victims through compensation for harm, 
and increasing compliance with norms by deterring violative 
corporate behavior. 
1. Corrective justice 
Classic rights-based theories underlying the domestic tort 
system and international human rights law may further justify 
 
 331. However, there are some opportunities for individuals to petition specific in-
ternational tribunals. For example, Art. 25(1) of the ECHR refers to competence of per-
sons, groups of individuals, and non-governmental organizations to lodge petitions al-
leging violation of Convention-protected rights. European Convention on Human 
Rights, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 25(1). 
 332. The European Commission on Human Rights has accepted petitions from 
trade unions and private associations as well as corporations. See TOM ZWART, THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS PETITIONS 46-47 (1994). The right to an individual 
petition under Article 1 of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR is a right only for 
individuals. The Human Rights Committee has declared group petitions inadmissible. 
See Report of the Human Rights Committee, Communications Nos. 360/1989 and 
361/1989, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 307-10, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989). 
 333. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(DISCUSSION DRAFT) (1999). 
 334. See Kingsbury, supra note 139, at 518. 
 335. United States judicial precedent may be instructive to international bodies. 
See supra note 287 and accompanying text. 
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class actions for enforcement of human rights plaintiffs’ claims 
against corporations.336 Theories of corrective justice are based 
upon the axioms that “the value of individual entitlements to 
personal security should be protected against . . . wrongful or 
nonconsensual invasions . . . and that [human rights] victims 
should be made whole.”337 Both the tort system and the system 
of human rights law secure personal rights, including compen-
sating victims after-the-fact and “policing the behavior of 
would-be violators to prevent wrongful infliction of incom-
pensable losses.”338 Collective adjudication protects personal se-
curity of the groups at issue by developing and enforcing uni-
versal norms regarding group rights.339 Civil litigation by 
groups of human rights victims engages courts in a moral dia-
logue, which contributes to more effective reasoning about in-
ternational human rights.340 
Practically speaking, without the opportunity to be repre-
sented in a class action in U.S. courts, the members of a human 
rights class will be unable to seek redress for violations of col-
lective or individual rights.341 Rights-based theories, holding 
that the dignity of individuals should be protected by the judi-
cial process, could therefore also apply to human rights 
classes.342 Rights-based theories assume that by not guarantee-
 
 336. See Rosenberg, Individual Justice by Collective Means, supra note 19, at 567, 
579-86 (discussing rights-based theories justifying class treatment). 
 337. Id. at 580. 
 338. Id. at 581. 
 339. Outcome-based participation theories hold that participation of the individ-
ual members of the class is good only to the extent that it facilitates sound public norm 
creation. Bone, Rethinking, supra note 19, at 201; see also Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme 
Court, 1978 Term– Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1978). 
 340. See Koh, supra note 18, at 2374. “Outcome-oriented theory evaluates partici-
pation for what it adds to the quality of the outcome,” most conventionally, “the final 
judgment, consisting of the legal remedy and the determination of legal and factual 
issues.” Bone, Rethinking, supra note 19, at 201 (examining process-oriented (some-
times called intrinsic) and outcome-oriented theories of participation (sometimes called 
instrumental) and arguing that the extent of a nonparty’s right to relitigate claims or 
issues should vary with type of case). 
 341. See Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The 
Right to Protect One’s Rights – Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1170-77 (discussing the 
use of litigation access fees and noting that the civility of our law rests on its recogni-
tion of individual entitlements and responsibilities). 
 342. See JERRY MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 177-80 
(1985) (discussing the dignitary process theory and arguing that direct participation 
has intrinsic value in promoting individual dignity); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 666 (2d ed. 1988) (“[G]rant[ing] to the individuals or groups 
against whom government decisions operate the chance to participate in the processes 
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ing each litigant a day in court individual dignity is compro-
mised.343 At the heart of rights theory is the concept of “moral 
harm”—“the special injustice someone suffers when one of her 
rights is wrongly denied”; this type of harm will inevitably oc-
cur when there is no forum at all for the adjudication of vic-
tims’ rights violated by international corporate activity.344 
In international law, the inherent good of participation in 
the creation of legal norms through the political process is the 
“possibility of self-realization through development of the social 
self.”345 Where ethnic or minority groups seek to enforce inter-
national human rights in the collective, the self-realization and 
dignity of the individual members as participators in the judi-
cial process is at stake only to the extent that the group’s inter-
ests are enforced.346 Accordingly, class adjudication, where the 
class interests are reinforced through deterrence mechanisms 
such as class injunctive and compensatory remedies, enhances, 
rather than compromises, the inherent dignity of individual 
absentee members of the class. 
2. Deterrence 
Utilitarian theories also justify class treatment in actions 
against large corporations engaged in risky behavior by creat-
ing optimal incentives for firms to take due care. Such incen-
tives may deter corporate joint ventures with corrupt govern-
ments in mass victimization of plaintiffs’ rights under CIL. 
Deterrence, in the view of some, remains the primary justi-
 
by which those decisions are made . . . expresses their dignity as persons.”); Frank I. 
Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in NOMOS 
XVIII: DUE PROCESS 126-27 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, eds., 1977) 
(“They attach value to the individual’s being told why the agent is treating him unfa-
vorably and to his having a part in the decision.”); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Dignitary 
Process; A Political Psychology of Liberal Democratic Citizenship, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 
433, 439-43 (1987) (advocating natural rights approach to due process based on liberal 
democratic values). 
 343. Rights-based adjudication theory “perhaps . . . assumes that, by not guaran-
teeing litigant autonomy” individual dignity is compromised. Bone, Rethinking, supra 
note 19, at 256-57. 
 344. See id. at 260. 
 345. See Henry Steiner, Political Participation as a Human Right, 1 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. Y.B. 77, 105 (1988). International human rights law does include the individual’s 
right to participate in general in the state’s legal process, which has been an essential 
basis of human rights law, despite being defined by vague norms and having disputed 
meanings in the international community. See id. 
 346. See supra Part II.B. 
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fication for a civil tort system in small claims cases.347 Human 
rights claims, even where great harm is alleged, may be analo-
gized to small claims classes where there are severe disincen-
tives to individually litigate the claims. However, even when a 
class of claims is litigated, deterrence may not be effective if 
the cost of litigation is less than the cost of altering unlawful 
practices and may require the computation of litigation costs to 
include the costs of avoiding injury.348 
By certifying and adjudicating human rights class actions, 
courts create a more even playing field for victims challenging 
corporate defendants.349 The corporation is the traditional 
model for collective litigation,350 enjoying its privileged status 
by virtue of the state’s grant of corporate status.351 Due to the 
deterrent effect of sizable class remedies, class actions may 
provide a workable means for holding corporations accountable 
to international human rights standards. 
Given the nature of the claims being enforced in human 
rights class actions, neither the theories underlying rights to 
participation nor the practical objectives of enforcement of hu-
man rights for groups justify denying class treatment on 
autonomy grounds.352 The class structure facilitates general-
ized policies of reform, deterrence, and corrective justice and 
provides a forum for making broad statements of accountability 
for human rights abuses on an international scale.353 Class ad-
judication provides the means by which the voice of human 
rights victims in the international community is heard when 
joined by the voice of the group within which the victim has 
 
 347. One of the justifications of the consumer class action is “that it is more im-
portant to deprive the defendant of ill-gotten gains than to deliver compensation to vic-
tims.” Marcus, supra note 106, at 889. 
 348. See Bone, Individual Justice by Collective Means, supra note 19, at 570-71; 
Rosenberg, supra note 121, at 878-79; Shapiro, supra note 108, at n.44. 
 349. See generally, Collins, supra note 183, at 18-19. 
 350. See Shapiro, supra note 108, at 919 (stating that defendant classes with a 
pre-existing coherence were often litigants in the early stages of class action develop-
ment, but today, defendant class actions are rare). 
 351. Organizational liability for violations of international human rights law is an 
under-developed area and is beyond the scope of this article. 
 352. Procedural rules such as Rule 23 may also fulfill the objectives of distribu-
tional justice. See Robert A. Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of 
Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 893, 905, 
908-18. 
 353. See Koh, supra note 18, at 2349 n.11; Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in 
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1291, 1298-1302 (1976). 
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suffered. Justice occurs when these voices are heard at the in-
ternational level.354 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Federal courts play a crucial role in providing a unique fo-
rum for groups aggrieved by the adverse consequences of inter-
national global corporate activity. In its application of class 
procedures, courts can participate in the interpretation of in-
ternational norms and expand and modify rights that would 
not be available to individuals, absent the ability to enforce 
them collectively. In class actions against private enterprises, 
plaintiff classes may finally be the key to deterring corporate 
violations of human rights.355 
Implementation of class action rules in the area of human 
rights litigation may achieve a greater good than simply 
achieving one of the rule’s purely procedural objectives of 
minimizing individual claims. The rules solidify legal rights by 
providing meaningful remedies to deter violations. The virtual 
absence of international accountability for corporate complicity 
with government violations of human rights has allowed many 
international offenders to escape liability. Class actions are the 
tool necessary to institute real change. 356 Class actions do so by 
preventing corporate entities from hiding behind defenses that 
would ordinarily protect them against individual plaintiffs.357 
The class action is an appropriate means for achieving the 
behavioral, cultural, political, and societal policies underlying 
Rule 23 at the international level.358 When evaluated in light of 
human rights policies, the class action is necessary because in-
dividual litigation fails to further the search for fairness or jus-
 
 354. See Collins, supra note 183, at 19 (Eizenstat, referring to the Holocaust sur-
vivors’ and families’ litigation, stated the following: “But of the hundreds of survivors 
I’ve met, the great bulk are pleased all this is happening. Even though what they will 
get back is a pittance, at the end of their lives at least the world finally recognized the 
plight they endured.”). 
 355. See generally Morgan, supra note 39. 
 356. See Collins, supra note 183, at 18 (Eizenstate stated: “[I]t took Judge Korman 
and the threat of sanctions to get the banks over the top.”). 
 357. See Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 
OR. L. REV. 157, 166-67 (1998). 
 358. See id. at 159-60, 170 (acknowledging that the Advisory Committee created 
the rule with the vision of allowing vindication of a person’s rights who may not other-
wise find justice). 
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tice sought by our judicial process.359 In sum, human rights 
class action litigation 1) crystallizes international norms for 
collective rights; 2) provides collective remedies; 3) allows the 
federal court to participate through transnational public law 
litigation in international legal development and enforcement 
of legal norms; 4) deters international actors; and 5) provides 
justice for victims. 
 
 
 359. See id. at 158. 
